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Abstract 
In today’s transportation system, countless numbers of vehicles are on the road and later 
generations have become mobile computers.  Vehicles now have embedded infotainment systems 
that enable user-friendliness and practicability with functions such as a built-in global 
positioning system, media playback device and application interface.  Smartphones and laptops 
can connect to them through Bluetooth and WiFi for all sorts of utilities.  This enables data flow 
between a user’s device and the infotainment system and because of this interaction, data 
remnants are kept on these embedded devices.  It is important to determine what type of data is 
stored long term since this information reflects a user’s activity and potential personal 
information.  In terms of forensics, this data could be used to solve criminal activities if a vehicle 
was suspected of being an accessory to a crime; raising general awareness about this topic is 
important due to the potential sensitive information circulated.  This main objective of this thesis 
is to demonstrate what types of information are stored on infotainment systems, how it can be 
acquired and the implications and contributions of the collected data in relation to the overall 
field of digital forensics. 
Keywords: digital forensics, internal vehicle components, embedded devices, 
infotainment systems, vehicular forensics 
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Overall Contribution 
This collaborated effort and thesis was made with the ultimate goal of identifying what 
types of information and data are stored on vehicular infotainment systems for its extended use, 
may it be for legal or personal use; we hope to positively contribute to the overall field of digital 
forensics, to law enforcement and raising general awareness about the data that is circulated and 
kept on these platforms.  We also hope this work and thesis can be used as a baseline or reference 
for future research efforts in regards to vehicular and mobile digital forensics as well as the 
internal electronic components of vehicles and interactions with infotainment systems.  The goal 
is to educate and showcase all relevant acquired data, its application and a framework to follow 
when interacting with such systems as well as validating that such data exists and can be put to 
use in the overall field of digital forensic. 
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Chapter I – Vehicular Infotainment Forensics: Collecting Data and 
Putting It into Perspective 
The evolution of technology has allowed for the implementation of embedded systems in 
every aspect of our lives.  This has made a huge impact on the development of vehicles and 
embedded technologies enabling many more utilities.  Typical modern vehicles are now 
composed of Electronic Control Units (ECUSs) which basically actuate a motor for a vehicle 
functionality to complete based on messages received.  Sensors that are embedded on the 
vehicles can also trigger the ECUs themselves for safety and efficiency reasons without the 
driver being aware, which can end up stopping non-desirable scenarios.  All in all, vehicles are 
starting to resemble computer/computer networks, which will be discussed later in this thesis in a 
comprehensive form for better understanding.  This leads to the connected devices that make up 
the vehicles and allow all their functionalities.  Take for example the infotainment system, a 
growing aspect of a vehicle’s components as in the past, it mainly constituted of a media device 
for radio and audio playback.  These devices are now outfitted with a built-in Global Positioning 
System (GPS), Bluetooth and WiFi connectivity for mobile devices such as smartphone and 
laptops and an application interface on top of the traditional media utilities.  These devices can 
even monitor information relating to the vehicle itself (e.g., motor status, tire pressure, braking 
status, etc.).   
Infotainment systems tend be manufactured by the original vehicle maker therefore can 
be closed source although most are simply rebranded devices bought from a technology supplier.  
This means that no standard has been established towards the development of the infotainment 
systems.  Luckily, Google has teamed up with technological and vehicle manufacturer giants to 
establish the Open Automotive Alliance (https://www.openautoalliance.net/) which has an aim 
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for developing a common platform across infotainment systems and the Android platform.  This 
has allowed the alliance to develop Android Auto, an application which interfaces a user’s 
Android phone to the “Android Auto ready” infotainment system directly.  Apple has also 
achieved the same type of application with Apple CarPlay, which allows iPhones to directly 
interface with the appropriate “Apple CarPlay ready” infotainment systems.  This is important to 
note as we are seeing a trend of popular devices easily and seamlessly connecting to 
infotainment systems. Although these applications are recently made available to users and 
functional in infotainment systems, they will not further be covered in the scope of this thesis.  
This is to simply state the increased amount of information flows between these systems and that 
they allow for direct interfacing between an Android or Apple device and the connected 
infotainment system. 
The widespread of infotainment systems leads to an important question: What is being 
stored long-term on these infotainment systems, considering how much interaction they have 
with end users’ personal devices?  When a user connects to these platforms, some functionalities 
require the user’s permission for access to certain aspects of the user’s personal device for some 
functionalities of the infotainment system to work (e.g., making phone calls with voice command 
using Ford’s SYNC platform, answering/making phone calls, sending/reading text messages, 
etc.).  With this in mind, there is an automatic assumption that data remnants are present on the 
infotainment device but it is important to determine exactly what.  When interacting and storing 
information on a personal computer, the user will be aware of what he/she is keeping on the 
device (excluding maybe cookies and session information when browsing online and temporary 
folders).  When users interact with an infotainment system after connecting it to their personal 
mobile device, they may not be aware that data is being stored as information is being relayed to 
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the vehicle infotainment platform automatically.  Users would not know what is being stored and 
it could be personal and sensitive information they would rather not have stored on their vehicle.  
With the vehicle infotainment aftermarket being just as huge as the main manufacturer one, this 
information could potentially end up in the wrong hands.  From a forensics point of view, this 
could help solve crimes when a vehicle is suspected of being somewhat involved in a crime (e.g., 
a vehicle gets stolen then recovered without the culprit therefore one could use the infotainment 
and GPS data to determine what the culprit did and where he/she went while  possessing the 
vehicle).  The information could also potentially help determine the cause of an accident on top 
of all the other sensor data collected.  The uses of this data, once put into perspective, could shine 
some light on what its practical uses could be and if some of it is necessary at all.  
This finally establishes the hypothesis of this research: What data is stored on in-vehicle 
infotainment systems and can we determine anything about the users based off this acquired 
information?  This thesis will consist of the following chapters: Chapter II will give an overview 
of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), vehicle internal network buses and components and 
how they communicate as well as overall security vulnerabilities involving both VANETs and 
internal communication components since infotainment systems are part of the in-vehicle 
network buses; Chapter III will discuss generic forensic concepts and its current state, the state of 
mobile device forensics due to their close interactions with infotainment systems, Android 
forensics as most popular aftermarket infotainment systems are Android based platforms and 
finally it will present the current state of vehicular forensics in general, not necessarily relating to 
infotainment systems; Chapter IV will present the acquisition methods for our infotainment 
systems and the results obtained from the acquisitions of infotainment systems; Chapter V will 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 13 
discuss the overall implications of the results acquired by this research and how it applies to 
digital forensics; Chapter VI will provide a conclusion summarizing the research. 
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Chapter II – VANETs and Vehicle Internal Network 
Buses/Components 
Modern vehicles have made leaps and bounds in terms of technological advancements 
and housing of components.  Embedded systems are adding more functionality to vehicles 
making them more efficient, practical and safe in terms of their intended design.  Inter-vehicle 
communication networks, also known as Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), are being 
researched and developed to modernize the transportation system in hopes of making it more 
efficient, safer and allowing vehicles to communicate with one another.   Modularity is also kept 
in mind as the transportation system is prone to advancements on its side as well due to vehicular 
advancements.  This chapter gives an overview of VANETs, internal network components of 
vehicles as well as their place in the transportation system.  The security state is also mentioned 
due to the interoperability of internal vehicle components as it is important to understand to the 
basis of vehicle vulnerabilities (and associated systems) as one system can compromise the other.   
 
2.1 State of Transportation System 
The VANET infrastructure has been in development and an active research topic for years 
now.  It has seen considerable progress for its proper implementation and standardization with 
collaborations from around the world.  This infrastructure leads to the implementation of the 
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), which is a collection of applications and services meant 
for a more efficient, safer and user-friendly transportation system.  In VANETs, vehicles will be 
able to communicate with other vehicles directly through peer-to-peer means called Vehicle-to-
Vehicle communications (V2V) and to static infrastructure through Vehicle-to-Infrastructure and 
Infrastructure-to-Vehicle communications (V2I and I2V).   
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Modern vehicles are now embedded with Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and On-Board 
Units (OBUs) to send and receive information to other vehicles or Road Side Units (RSUs). 
RSUs and vehicles are used to send critical information to other peers and to communicate to 
other parts and types of network infrastructures such as the Internet.  RSUs are important in the 
operation of VANETs because they are used as relays to send information to all vehicles (for e.g., 
safety-related messages such as an accident occurring within a specific region and authentication 
messages for system validation).  Vehicle tracking, vehicle speed, Basic Safety Messages 
(BSMs) and other related information can all be exchanged between the vehicles themselves 
directly to ensure efficient and safe operation of the vehicles in their respective environments.  
What is important about VANETs is that they incorporate other means of communications to 
facilitate their operation.  Examples of these as shown by Checkoway et al. [10] are: Bluetooth; 
broadcast channels, such as radio and GPS channels); addressable channel, such as OnStar [10]; 
and cellular channels, including 3G/4G LTE and basic voice channels for cellular 
communications.  Combining all of these technologies together offers much more robustness to 
VANETs; however, on a security aspect, it offers more attack surfaces and potential for more 
vulnerabilities to be discovered and have these technologies leveraged against the vehicle and its 
users. 
The IEEE 1609 standard shown by the IEEE Standards Association [29], also known as 
the Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE), is a service recognized by the ITS.  It is 
employed in the United States and similar infrastructures employed around the world for 
VANETs so that vehicles and respective infrastructure can communicate.  This standard can also 
be associated to the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) protocol for radio 
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spectrum allocation used by WAVE technologies.  WAVE embodies many standards for its secure 
and efficient communications.  They are as followed: 
 IEEE Std 802.11 (2012)—Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and 
Physical Layer (PHY) specifications for metropolitan and local networks as well 
as data exchange between systems 
 IEEE Std 1609.2 (2013)—WAVE Security Services for applications and 
Management Messages; makes use of Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) as an 
encryption standard 
 IEEE Std 1609.3 (2010)—WAVE Networking Services 
 IEEE Std 1609.4 (2010)—WAVE Multi-Channel Operations 
 IEEE Std 1609.11 (2010)—WAVE ITS over-the-air payment data exchange 
protocol 
 IEEE Std 1609.12—WAVE Identifier Allocations 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has developed its set of standards 
for VANET communication and information exchange for the ITS based off IEEE 802.11 
technologies shown by Rizzo and Brookson [65].  ETSI ITS standards will take in consideration 
the IEEE 1609.2 data sets, but it will adopt them to fit explicit protocols developed for ETSI 
standards and will collaborate closely with the IEEE community.  Here are some of the current 
ETSI ITS security standards: 
 ETSI TS 102 867—ITS Security Service IEEE 1609.2 stage 3 mapping 
 ETSI TS 102 940—ITS Security Service for communications security 
architecture and management 
 ETSI TS 102 941—ITS Security Service for Trust and Privacy Management 
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 ETSI TS 102 942—ITS Security Service for Access Control 
 ETSI TS 102 943—ITS Security Service for Confidentiality Services 
 ETSI TS 103 097—ITS Security Service for headers and certificate formats 
Vehicle components allow for a vehicle to generate, log and exchange data about its 
surrounding and users in real time.  The data logged hypothetically gives a third party the ability 
to analyze this data if it manages to access it.  According to Illera and Vidal [30], data dumps of 
vehicle crashes are stored into a vehicle’s Electronic Control Unit (ECU).  These data dumps, if 
retrieved, could grant law enforcement agencies the ability to reconstruct accidents and 
determine the cause of an accident.  Data about a driver could also be collected if he or she was 
suspected of criminal activities.  Infotainment systems inside modern vehicles could determine a 
lot about the end user through his trends and activities, not to mention the localization data 
produced by embedded GPS systems. 
The data logged and circulating inside these vehicles directly relate to the driver’s habit 
since it reflects the users actions.  Insurance companies, such as the Canadian firm Desjardins, 
make use of hardware modules to monitor these habits.  Their service Ajusto, reported by CTV 
Ottawa [15], is a plug-in-play car attachment used by Desjardins which monitors user activity.  
Wall [74] reported that user activity and driving habits are measured through the use of the same 
“black box” units and related applications installed in smartphones.  This allows good and safe 
drivers to pay less insurance fees since their recorded habits reflect lower chances of causing an 
accident and breaking the law.  After contacting a Desjardins technical support representative, it 
was confirmed that the data is kept on the Ajusto box locally until transmitted.  The transmission 
is done twice a day if still connected to its respective cellular network on Canadian soil.  If the 
vehicle is outside Canada, the data is stored locally onto the Ajusto device until it connects back 
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to the Canadian network.  Based off this information, the possibility of extracting the information 
kept on these specific devices becomes more apparent and plausible as two large time windows 
are made available or the time window become indefinite if the vehicle is outside of its intended 
country of operation.  The ability to verify exactly what type of information is kept onto devices 
such as Ajusto could potentially be used to determine information of the vehicle driver.  
Additionally, what needs to be verified is if any of that or related information is kept in other 
components of the vehicle, more specifically, the infotainment system.  This information can be 
potentially extracted and analyzed by third parties. 
 
2.2 Internal Communication Buses 
Modern vehicles now make use of many computer buses within their internal components 
to send and receive operational messages.  ECUs process this data then actuate mechanisms to 
accomplish tasks requested by the vehicle’s user.  Vehicles are starting to resemble actual 
computer networks and each component can be viewed as a node for passing or processing 
information.  Some of these components and buses are segregated from one another for 
compartmentalization; however, they are all able to communicate with one another to fulfill the 
vehicle user’s demands using the Control Area Network (CAN) bus.  As per Everett and McCoy 
[17], there are multiple modules/units and respective buses and they are each responsible for 
specific traffic flow inside the vehicle.  The following list is the core networking buses within a 
vehicle for data exchange: 
 CAN (Controller Area Network) – Core bus that links all buses together for data 
exchange and provides an interface for on-board diagnostics 
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 LIN (Local Interconnect Network) – Sub-network used for low-speed and 
bandwidth applications. For e.g., doors and sliding windows up and down 
 FlexRay – Sub-network used for safety critical and high-speed messages. For e.g., 
vehicle stability control and embedded sensors 
 MOST (Media Oriented System Transport) – Sub-network used for high-speed 
and bandwidth multimedia related applications. For e.g., music/video streaming 
and vehicle cameras 
The following list describes the core modules attached to the aforementioned buses. In general, 
they are found in modern vehicles and associated internal networks as shown by Everett and 
McCoy [17]: 
 Junction Box – provides typical functions for the vehicle’s circuits but in this 
case, connects the OBD II (On-Board Diagnostics) port to the CAN bus 
 Engine Control Unit – Controls actuators for the engine to ensure optimal 
performance and does so by reading acquired data from multiple sensors through 
CAN bus 
 Multimedia Head Unit – infotainment system in this case, communicates to dash 
and multimedia displays through MOST bus and can receive data from CAN bus 
as well 
 Stability Control Unit – uses FlexRay sub-network to engage stability control 
ECUs and actuators and relay/receive information to CAN bus 
 Tire Pressure Control Unit – directly affiliated with Tire Pressure Monitoring 
System (TPMS) for relaying information about each tire through the CAN bus 
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 HSM (Hardware Security Module) – Stores and secures sensitive data (for e.g., 
private keys) 
 Telematics Control Unit – controls embedded systems (for e.g. GPS unit, 3G/LTE, 
WiFi communication interfaces) within the vehicle through the CAN bus 
 Body Control Unit – uses the LIN bus for engaging door locks, window/side 
mirror positioning, seat positioning, etc. and relays/receives information through 
the CAN bus 
As mentioned above, the CAN network is responsible for forwarding all traffic that needs to be 
relayed between each sub-network.  It is absolutely vital to the vehicle’s operation since it 
forwards all queries and responses.  Error messages also circulate on this network for diagnostic 
messages.  End users are then notified through the vehicle’s dash display about a present issue. 
Access to a CAN bus could lead to great live vehicular forensics if enough data is collected and 
analyzed correctly.  Once connected to the CAN, it could grant potential access to separate 
modules within the vehicles and their respective ECUs.  This could then lead to further vehicular 
forensic opportunities through non-volatile memory.  The network/bus used for 
infotainment/multi-media traffic is the MOST bus.  The MOST bus makes use of optical fiber 
cables and can now reach speeds of up to 150 Mbps.  The speeds achieved by this sub-network 
hint that a lot of information circulates on this bus type.  As mentioned above, access to the CAN 
bus could potentially lead to further research whether information stored within other buses can 
be accessed and downloaded (for e.g. the MOST bus being accessed through the CAN and 
potential for downloading stored data on an infotainment system).  Figure 1, shown below, 
displays a diagram of all buses and modules discussed by Everett and McCoy [17]. 
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Figure 1. Vehicle Network Components and Buses [17] (original picture edited) 
 
2.3 VANET Security Challenges 
VANET security shows that there are many mechanisms being developed to ensure that 
all security concepts are enforced and maintain a standard of efficiency for the operation of 
vehicular networks.  The mechanisms being developed do have specific reasons and are made to 
fend off many types of attacks that are present and could potentially target a VANET.  It is 
important to be aware of these types of attacks since internal vehicle network buses and 
communication components are closely intertwined and the potential for global access of the 
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vehicle is plausible if VANETs or the vehicles themselves are exploited.  Work shown by Rawat, 
Sharma and Sushil [63] demonstrates these types of attacks.  Here is a list of network attacks that 
affect network communications when it comes to V2V and V2I communications: 
 Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks – as mentioned above, these attacks can target 
any specific object within the network in hopes of disrupting network service and 
functionality so that all operations are delayed or rendered useless with the use of 
excessive traffic and/or over-utilizing key resources in the infrastructure 
 Sybil attacks – also elaborated by Yu, Xu and Xiao [79], Sybil attacks are done 
when a malicious users impersonates multiple identities hoping to fool legitimate 
users in taking different routes due to traffic congestion protocols 
 Message suppression-iteration/falsification – a malicious user manages to drop 
legitimate traffic in the network in attempts of falsifying road conditions. 
Alteration is when legitimate messages are altered to fool legitimate users with 
incorrect data. Falsification is when an attacker broadcasts false information to 
influence the traffic to his liking or cause havoc 
 Replay attack – legitimate messages are captures and used later in legitimate 
circumstances for illegitimate means 
 GPS spoofing – an attacker falsifies GPS information to fool other vehicles into 
thinking they are at a different location with his/her own GPS simulator 
 Tunneling attack – two physically separated parts of a VANET are connected 
through a tunnel thinking they are neighbours so an attacker could analyze the 
traffic of perform selective forwarding attacks 
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 Timing attack – time slots are altered so that safety critical message are delayed 
and received after their useful lifetime is outlived 
 Man-in-the-middle attack – the attacker is between a legitimate communication 
session and intercepts traffic to see the content but forwards it to the right end 
destinations to remain invisible 
 Home attacks – malicious user attempts to take control of the vehicle’s internal 
components with the use of the Internet 
 ID disclosure – a target’s location is disclosed and made publicly available so that 
anyone can view the location of the vehicle 
 Brute-force attack – an illegitimate user attempts to break cryptographic keys 
used in secure communication sessions 
All these types of attacks have the potential of affecting VANETs and end users.  That is why 
security standards are being developed so that all fronts are reinforced and that these attacks 
greatly reduced, if not rendered completely ineffective.  These attacks, if well-coordinated, could 
also lead to the compromise of internal components if vehicles are lured to specific locations 
which allow an organized attacker to perform more sophisticated types of attacks. 
A different attack has been introduced that basically fully compromises a node in the 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Network.  The work presented by Lin et al. [37] demonstrates that a malicious 
user attempts to physically capture nodes inside the network.  Once physical access is acquired, 
the adversary implements malware as well as attempts to reveal secret keys so that all 
communications with compromised nodes are known and traffic is exposed.  Privacy concerns 
also arise as location could then be disclosed, not to mention other attacks could be launched 
including Denial-of-Service, spamming, Sybil attacks, etc.  A compromised node could then 
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affect further nodes attached to it so it can spread into the network and increase its potential 
regional reach, if not global, up until the entire network is compromised.  The only downfall to 
this attack is that physical access is required so some parts of the infrastructure are not reachable 
(e.g., highway RSUs) and/or publicly exposed; however, if managed correctly and not caught in 
the act, RSUs that are not easily physically accessible could fall prey to one that is and be 
compromised.  This type of attack is dangerous as it enables a platform to launch all mentioned 
above attacks through a seemingly legitimate node of the infrastructure. Overall, many methods 
are available for attacking a network.  Many methods and mechanisms must therefore be 
deployed and further researched to ensure end user security. 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks show definite promise in the functionality it is intended to 
provide.  The ability to send information about road conditions, accidents, congestion warnings 
from indirect neighbours, to name a few, is useful as discussed by Younes and Boukerche [78].  
The wireless technology employed to do this is quite efficient in enabling the operations of 
VANETs, but like any other infrastructure, specifically wireless oriented ones, vulnerabilities to 
attack the network arise.  Rawat, Sharma and Sushil [63] present home attacks that are directed 
towards taking control of vehicles using, and not limited to, the Internet, so that internal vehicle 
components are exploited and taken over.  Works shown in [10][16] [32][38] [59] present 
multiple attack surfaces that are exposed through external components and allow compromise of 
the internal network components of the vehicle objects. There are many attack vectors that are of 
the following: 
 OBD II port – direct physical access to internal components of the vehicle 
 “PassThru” device – Device that connects to OBD II port for analysis of system 
buses and firmware updates 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 25 
 Media devices (e.g., MP3s, USBs, CDs, etc.) – direct physical access to internal 
components of the vehicle 
 Bluetooth – short range communications access to internal components of the 
vehicle 
 Cellular – long range communications access to internal components of the 
vehicle 
 Broadcast Channels – long range communications access to internal components 
of the vehicle 
The work presented by Checkoway et al. [10] explains how full vehicle compromise (for e.g., 
vehicle acceleration and braking, to name a few) was attained and all possible ways they have 
managed to successfully do it.  Vehicle objects have shown vulnerability from direct physical 
access to the vehicle’s OBD II port.  If an attacker manages to get access to this port when the 
driver is not present, the culprit can listen in on the internal network components and debug the 
communication in attempt of reverse-engineering the internal protocols.  The user can use 
packets that he/she crafts, based off the debug output, to take control of the vehicle.  This is the 
most efficient way of compromising a vehicle, but physical access to the port is hard and is 
noticeable by users since the car has to be broken into. “PassThru” devices, which are used by 
vehicle manufacturers, authorized dealerships and mechanic shops, are used to update and gain 
access to a vehicle’s internal network components (CANs, LINs, FlexRay, etc.).  Once this 
device is connected, they can update and maintain the firmware, which would be periodically 
done when a vehicle comes in for maintenance schedules and safety checks.  These devices can 
also use wireless communications and allow an untrusted third party to connect to it.  When the 
device connects to the OBD II port, the attacker could gain access to the internal components of 
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the vehicle shown by Checkoway et al. [10].   No authentication checks are done by the internal 
components when a PassThru device connects to it, meaning anyone connected to the PassThru 
gains automatic access to the OBD II port. Authentication means would need to be implemented 
to stop this from happening. An attacker could also upload malicious packages to the PassThru 
device so that whenever it connects to a vehicle, the files are uploaded to the vehicle to 
compromise the internal network. This method would allow multiple unsuspecting vehicle 
objects to be infiltrated.  Media devices such as CDs and USB devices can also be used to upload 
malicious information to vehicles if inserted in the proper access channels.  It has been show by 
Checkoway et al. [10] that if CDs contain malformed audio files, they can update the firmware 
inside the vehicle through a buffer overflow attack. 
Bluetooth has also shown to be vulnerable inside vehicles.  Checkoway et al. [10] 
demonstrated that through Bluetooth device and car pairing, the vehicle can be compromised.  
With the use of “Bluesniff”, which is used to sniff and capture Bluetooth MAC addresses, brute-
forcing methods can be done to pair to the vehicle. Approximately nine PINs per minute can be 
brute forced to pair to a vehicle according to trials successfully made by Checkoway et al. [10].  
Although this does not sound like a lot of attempts in the given time frame, this technique could 
be done in a public garage where thousands of vehicles may be present, brute-forcing one within 
seconds.  This is plausible as tests presented by Checkoway et al. [10], demonstrate that a single 
vehicle was compromised within fifteen minutes.  This time significantly reduces when there’s 
more than one vehicle, and, once the device of the attacker is paired to the vehicle, custom 
applications can be used to gain access to the vehicle’s network. 
 Just like Bluetooth, long range communication means can also be used to exploit buffer 
overflow vulnerabilities inside the vehicle to fully compromise it.  Cellular communication can 
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be used to breach a vehicle’s security, which demonstrates how volatile and dangerous wireless 
communications can be when exploited.  AqLink, a protocol used to send and receive voice 
communication on cellular channels, has been reverse-engineered by Checkoway et al. [10].  
This protocol changes analog bits to digital ones so that they can be interpreted by the internal 
systems.  This opens up the possibility of using audio playback to trigger an exploit that was 
successfully done in the presented research.  They were able to phone a remote vehicle that is 
within cellular range and play an audio file through an audio device, and it compromised the 
vehicle through a buffer overflow exploit.  The issue with this type of attack is that the 
transmission speed is limited and can only send data at a certain limited rate; a certain amount of 
data must therefore be delivered before a timeout occurs to trigger the attack.  Well-crafted and 
short code must be done to successfully exploit the vehicle object.  Other mediums such as 3G or 
addressable channels, such as OnStar, allow for faster delivery mechanism with a much bigger 
payload, but the vehicle must be within range of 3G transmitters to be contacted.  Work 
discussed by Cai et al. [7] shows that Bluetooth can further be exploited with the use of antennas 
to boost signals and coupling with devices that have more than one antenna (in this case 
vehicles).  The vehicles do not need to be in line of sight, and with the use of multiple antennas, 
the vehicle object and Bluetooth device can be paired, making it much harder for an attacker 
from being detected since visual cues are not available.  
Many attack surfaces exist in vehicles for targeting their internal components that interact 
with the vehicle itself or vehicular network of this infrastructure.  In fact, Miller and Valasek [44] 
and Smith [68] have both published comprehensive guides/handbooks about their research and 
methodologies used to hack actual vehicles in their possession.  Chung [12], Greenberg [24] and 
The Associated Press [69] reported on both Miller and Valasak’s research successes.  They were 
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both funded by the United States Department of Defense (DOD) to look into the matter and that 
is how their project started in the first place; this shows the interests (and problems) that vehicles 
can really have, especially if government agencies are willing to find out more about them (also 
see Markey [41]).  Fox-Brewsters [18] reported there was even an open source tool released by 
an ex-Tesla employee which directly interfaces with the on-board vehicle CAN and takes control 
of the vehicle if vulnerable. This demonstrates that security standards must be kept under 
constant revision to ensure that all components are secured and cannot be easily exploited, if not 
impossible, since security in VANETs is extremely important to ensure end user safety and well-
being.  Figure 2 shown below depicts a diagram of previously mentioned attack surfaces by 
Checkoway et al. [10], which are to be considered when it comes to vehicle and user safety, 
which should be paramount.
 
Figure 2. Attacks surfaces in VANETs [10] 
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Chapter III – Understanding Forensic Analysis 
The realm of forensics is all about the analysis of material and evidence so that one can 
associate it to an event and/or person, especially when crimes are the reason for the investigation 
in the first place.  This subject is quite prevalent in law enforcement agencies as their main goals 
are to prevent and solve crimes using forensic means.  In the current day and age, digital 
forensics are becoming the norm for finding clues and evidence since many crimes are becoming 
digitalized or involve it to some aspect.  This chapter will discuss generic digital forensics as 
well as some legal concepts for the province of Ontario in Canada to give the reader an 
appropriate background of the field and further understanding of the following chapters/sections 
and main point of the research. 
 
3.1 Digital Forensics Model 
As presented by Reith, Carr and Gunsch [64], digital forensics is the derivation of 
evidence from any type of computer source or device with computational capabilities.  The 
methodologies used to obtain such data is done through specialized software and tools, which 
allow interpreting the information properly so it can be used to advance and solve investigations.  
Until recently, there was lack of standardization due to the high complexity of computers and 
number of methods to acquire data for analysis.  Reith, Carr and Gunsch [64] had the objective 
of establishing an abstract model and framework that law enforcement could use to properly 
acquire and present digital evidence and is as following: 
1. Identification – determination and recognition of different types of incidents 
2. Preparation – preparation of techniques, search warrants, tools, management and 
monitoring authorization 
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3. Approach strategy – formulate an approach that minimizes impact to victim while 
maximizing data collection 
4. Preservation – ensure that the digital evidence is secured, isolated and not 
tampered with for further analysis 
5. Collection – duplication of data sets using proper tools and methods as well as 
recording the physical scene 
6. Examination – thorough analysis of acquired data sets for specific evidence while 
keeping detailed documentation of the search 
7. Analysis – determination of significance of evidence and making conclusions 
accordingly based on evidence found 
8. Presentation – summarization and explanation of arrived conclusions 
9. Returning Evidence – acquired digital and physical property must be returned to 
rightful owner and have criminal evidence extracted properly off the 
aforementioned property   
These guidelines are used to ensure proper handling of cases when it comes to forensic evidence 
in general.  Other frameworks can be used but in this case, Reith, Carr and Gunsch [64] give a 
more specific approach to take to ensure evidence integrity and its proper handling.  It is 
important to note that the steps presented can be adjusted accordingly based on the case itself but 
it is useful to follow a similar process, especially in the case of digital forensics.  Overall, as long 
as steps are taken to respect the following four phases showed by Baryamureeba and Tushabe 
[6], the entire process should be legitimate: 
1. Collection – entire process of collecting evidence and its documentation 
2. Examination – visibility of evidence is made clear and explained 
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3. Analysis – determine value of evidence and its significance for the case 
4. Reporting – documentation of entire process and pertinent data recuperated 
Some models go deeper and have more steps and phases to ensure legitimate handling of 
evidence but this shall not be covered as it is not the goal of this research; a general 
understanding of the framework for a forensic case and its handling will suffice simply for 
context of the topic. 
 
3.2 Provincial Implications and Processes  
When it comes to the legal aspect of forensics, certain laws and regulations must be 
followed when it comes to acquiring electronic devices from a potential suspect.  As per the 
Ontario Provincial Police in this case as an example, many procedures are established to ensure 
that the acquisition of said devices and data is correctly acquired and within legal boundaries.  
Their search warrant guidelines [55][56][57] give a thorough description of what a forensic 
examiner is expected to obtain while out on a case and analyzing data sets.  Guidelines are also 
presented on how to handle such evidence in the case of court, as shown by Gonzales, Schofield 
and Hagy [22].  There are respective guidelines to follow for computers (infotainment systems 
would fall into this category), cell/smartphones and GPS devices when it comes getting and 
enforcing a search warrant.  As long as the specifications of the warrant itself are not overlooked 
and established restrictions are respected, the suspect will know exactly what law enforcement 
agencies are entitled to look into when evidence is being analyzed so their expectation of privacy 
is not violated.  For example, a warrant for a computer acquisition can specifically limit the 
scope of the search to fraud so a forensic analyst would only be entitled to search for files that 
would show evidence of fraudulent activities.  Of course, the warrant itself specifies that the 
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search itself could entice looking for hidden files/file systems for further analysis but as long as 
the search itself remains in its scope, it is legal.   
As per the Articulation of Categories provided by the OPP [49], it is also important to 
note that there are different classes of data.  Each category helps the investigation in its own way 
and are as followed: 
1. Communications – all data that relates to communication between the suspect and 
potential accomplices and victims, which includes any of the mediums of 
communications such as voice, text and multimedia 
2. Usage of device – all data that points to the specific usage and time spent on 
resources by the suspect before, during and after the offence so that patterns can 
be established and facts verified due to time stamps and system clocks 
3. Ownership – all data that links data and computer resources to the owner or 
respective users to determine if the suspect was involved in specific actions and 
events on the device since multiple users are a possibility 
4. Multimedia content – all data relating to multimedia file types which includes 
videos, sound recordings, images and their respective metadata to further analyze 
their potential implications in regards to the suspect 
5. Passwords, encryption keys and access codes – all data relating to authorized 
access of resources within the device or to the device itself since passwords, 
encryption keys and access codes can be stored anywhere on the device for 
redundancy, which would allow the forensic examiner to further his investigation 
without being locked out of electronic resources 
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6. Device and software configuration – all data that relates to the configuration of 
the device itself (and installed software) so that the forensic examines can better 
determine on how to properly proceed with handling the device due to different 
file system types and potential obfuscation techniques employed by the user to 
hide data 
As a side note, as shown by Raghavan [62], it is important to note that metadata is “data about 
data” and applies to all data types and artifacts as it exists on all organized data structures (i.e. 
system/file system metadata, geographical metadata, application-specific metadata, digital image 
metadata, etc.).  The metadata itself is information relating to data types, timestamps of when 
created and modified, location coordinates, ownership and file size to name a few examples.  
Separating the different data types acquired makes the approach more systematic and helps 
clarify the approach used in finding potential evidence.  As computers and technology evolves, 
more and more data sets are available and being stored so it is important not to confuse any of 
them, especially in a criminal investigation.  The articulation of categories [49] is important to 
know in this case as it applies to every electronic device with storage capabilities regardless of 
the exact platform.    
 In terms of other procedures for proper handling of computer related evidence, the OPP 
provides many more guidelines for physical handling of devices such as analog/digital video 
evidence seizure, physical seizure of a computer and cell phone/mobile device physical seizure 
(even relating to specific devices such as iPhones due to proprietary nature) 
[48][50][51][52][53].  These guidelines basically ensure that data is not corrupted or 
compromised (i.e. leave powered off devices off, powered on devices on, remove SIM cards if 
present, do not attempt to brute force passwords, document surroundings, etc.).  This will not be 
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further looked into as simply the knowledge of proper physical handling is needed to understand 
that data sets could be influenced by its improper handling. 
3.2.1 Legal Force Elements 
In relation to the articulation of categories and proper handling of evidence [49], specific 
aspects have direct implications to the legality and integrity of a court case.  Park, Lee, Kim and 
Shon [58] discuss five elements that have legal force: 
1. Hash function – these functions generate a pseudo value of fixed length for a 
program, application or file.  Basically a signature unique to a specific digital 
entity that cannot be replicated due to it changing when its content is also 
modified.  This would ensure that copied images that were analyzed were not 
modified since their extraction and analysis  
2. Logging – it is important to record every step of every process to keep the 
integrity of the chain of custody intact in between different case phases as well as 
exact processes performed on the target system 
3. Timestamps – every procedure done on a case is sequential therefore having 
timestamps further preserve the integrity of the case 
4. Proven tools/devices – methodologies, tools and devices that have been already 
proven successful through testing can demonstrate validity of results 
5. Reporting – every process and step taken has to be documented in a 
comprehensive fashion for non tech-savvy individuals in the courtroom for proper 
understanding of how and what evidence was obtained 
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3.2.2 Case Law Example. 
As per the Court of Appeal of Ontario [14][54], this case law is an interesting example as 
it demonstrates the handling of cellphones/smartphones by law enforcement with expectation of 
privacy.  To summarize, two suspects were arrested for a robbery and had a non-password 
protected cellphone that was seized and searched without a warrant on the scene of arrest.  
Communication-related evidence was found at that time but the suspect claimed it was an 
invasion of privacy as there was no warrant.    
This is the most relevant example in showing that investigators and the court of justice 
will face challenges when it comes to validating evidence and/or access to a mobile device’s 
data.  In our modern times, cellphones (now majorly smartphones) are closely intertwined to our 
personal lives which directly relates to reasonable expectation of privacy in any case.  Reason for 
probable grounds to search such a device without a warrant at the time of arrest can and will be 
constantly challenged due to the aforementioned expectation of privacy since smartphones are 
literally handheld mobile computers (and with the case of computers, they require pre-authorized 
warrants on their own).  They obviously can have evidence on them and help point to other 
suspects due to (draft) messages and call logs which would be valid reasons of immediate search, 
but the complexity of modern devices would allow anyone to justify why it is unlawful and for 
that procedure to not be within the expectation of privacy if not properly justified.  The use of 
passwords and locked screens further complicates the process as they emphasize the expectation 
of privacy.  One would debate that no one is allowed on their respective device for personal and 
sensitive information being revealed hence why they have a password.  As the case mentions 
[54], for such a device to be searched immediately, four conditions must be met (assuming the 
contents can be accessed at the time of the arrest): 
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1. Lawful arrest – suspect’s arrest must be valid and based on probable grounds 
2. Search is incidental (not the object) of the arrest – Suspect is seen holding   
  hostages at gunpoint and communicating on his mobile device at same time (i.e. 
  potentially talking to accomplices) 
3. Search’s extent and nature is tailored to the arrest – Using the above example, 
communications would be the area of interest (so Short Message 
Service/Multimedia Message Service messages (SMS/MMS respectively – also 
known as text messages) and call logs and messaging applications only) 
4. Search itself must be documented in detail – this is important as without it, some  
  details could jeopardize the case if not noted (e.g. if sent messages were delivered  
  but not read) 
There could even be the added reason for protecting the data as devices are now being 
implemented with methods/encryption schemes that would allow a phone to be completely 
locked out and made unusable if the screen locks or if a password is required (i.e. as per The 
Indian Express [70], the Apple vs. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) case – all data is 
encrypted under the lock screen passcode encryption key which Apple cannot decrypt.  The FBI 
wants backdoor access).  This case shows the relevance and potential legal limitations on the 
technology industry side and/or government entities and could apply to any mobile devices such 
as infotainment system. 
 
3.3 Digital Forensic Processes 
The process of data acquisition can be as easy as connecting the target device to your 
computer/tool but sometimes it can be as difficult as creating or finding a custom built solution 
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for it.  This also all depends on the platforms involved and available methodologies. Mukasey, 
Sedwick and Hagy [45] demonstrate that there are many types of device storage due to the 
information technology environment and its advancement.  From personal computers, to portable 
storage such as USB sticks and external hard drives to more diverse network oriented solutions 
such as cloud computing.  These also employ different hardware platforms for storage ranging 
from the traditional computer hard drive (HDD) to flash memory chips.  Considering the varying 
existing technologies, different tools and methodologies have been developed to extract data 
regardless of the platform it is stored on.   
3.3.1 Extraction Types. 
Generally, when it comes to acquiring data off a device, there are two methods shown by 
Ashcroft, Daniels and Hart [3]: 
1. Physical extraction – This extraction process is done without regards to the file 
system itself and at the physical level of the drive.  Methods used in this include 
keyword searching across the drive, file carving to search for specific types of 
files and extraction and examination of partitions and unallocated space to ensure 
the entire drive is accounted for 
2. Logical Extraction – This extraction process is done in conjunction with the file 
system and will use it to identify directory structures and all file attributes, 
recovery of deleted files and all metadata used within the file system; another 
extraction, referred to as a file system extraction, can also be associated to a 
logical extraction (it may extract additional hidden files or deleted information but 
generally associated to a logical extraction due to their similar nature) 
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It is important to note that there is a third type called manual extraction and will be discussed in a 
later section. File carving at the physical level of extraction is an effective method of recovering 
specific data artifacts as it looks for types of files.  As per Yoo et al. [77], file carving locates 
specific data artifacts by looking for specific matches of metadata.  In this case, the forensic 
analyst would use metadata provided in the header and footer of the file and seek for specific 
signature matches which directly identify a file’s type.  This method is particularly useful for 
finding specific images or documents.  As per Ashcroft, Daniels and Hart [3], this does not mean 
that some potential evidence cannot be overlooked as techniques exist to conceal the data.  An 
examiner must ensure that the data types are truly what they seem by checking the header and 
footer of the file’s metadata so that they match.  The access to compressed and encrypted files is 
also paramount to an investigation as a lot of data can be hidden there.  It is a matter of reversing 
the process and/or finding these hidden directories to ensure all the data is accounted for 
potential evidence. 
3.3.2 Live Memory Acquisition. 
Data acquisition off the storage unit (for e.g. hard drive, flash storage, etc.) is not the only 
location data can reside on as data extraction from live volatile memory (i.e. Random Access 
Memory (RAM)) can also hold potential information due to its nature of storing all running 
information on a device. Vömel and Freiling [73] present many different methods to acquire data 
stored on live memory: 
 Dedicated hardware – use of specialized hardware inserted in PCI slot of 
computer that makes Direct Memory Access (DMA) operations for a physical 
copy of the live memory 
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 Specialized hardware bus – use of the Firewire port to send DMA operations to 
copy the content of the RAM 
 Virtualization – the virtual memory file located on the host PC will contain the 
suspended memory of the virtual machine that needs to be analyzed. 
 Software crash dumps – use of the crash dump files generated when Windows 
based operating systems unexpectedly halt.  These contain the entire memory 
dump of the system when it was running and can be triggered as well as analyzed 
by Microsoft owned tools or manual methods 
 User level application – use of custom specialized software to extract data from 
live memory and parsed to readable format 
 Kernel level applications – use of specialized vendor distributed software to 
extract data from live memory 
 Operating system injection – use of an independent operating system injected in 
the target system which creates a snapshot of the volatile data by freezing the state 
of the host system 
 Cold booting – use of artificial cooling on RAM modules after power down to 
preserve memory contents followed by cold booting of custom operating system 
that allows the data to be analyzed and extracted 
 Hibernation file – use of the Windows based hyberfil.sys when the system state 
and suspended (i.e. hibernation and sleep mode) which holds a snapshot of the 
live memory 
It is important to know that some of these methods are already well know forensic tools and 
applications which have been in use for a while for all intended forensic purposes.  Extraction of 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 40 
live memory, when possible, is a definite objective of a forensic case due to the potential 
information and data sets it holds but some methods are more appropriate than others in terms of 
deployment and use according to Vömel and Freiling [73] (i.e. kernel level application 
methodologies and virtualization when available… the other methods have their respective use 
but more limitations). Seo, Lee and Shon [67] mention an important tool that is used in our 
research for infotainment system forensics which is ‘dd.’  This function is a default one on Linux 
systems and can be used to copy specific portions of the devices including all of the storage 
blocks and live memory.  There are many different tools and applications that can be used 
enumerated by Rafique and Khan [61] such as Encase, Forensic Toolkit (FTK) and Sleuth Kit 
(Autopsy) which were also utilized to analyze different file systems in this research project. 
3.3.3 Network Related Forensics. 
Digital forensics does not limit itself to search for evidence on one specific device or 
having access to just one.  Many services are offered online that allow anyone to communicate 
with anyone through many mediums may it be instant messaging applications, email services, 
file transfer protocols, etc.  It is important to have a basic understanding of the implications of 
online forensics and what information is relevant.  Gonzales, Schofield and Hagy [23] present 
and explain aspects of Internet related forensics.  Depending on what evidence is being sought, a 
forensic examiner must keep in mind the following devices and services to check when 
conducting such an investigation.  Gonzales, Schofield and Hagy [23] list them as the following: 
 User’s computer 
 Internet Service Provider of anyone involved 
 Log files of involved routers, firewalls, web servers, email servers and any other 
utilized services 
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Internet Service Providers (ISP) can also host a lot of information on users when it comes to 
examining potential evidence.  Luckily, there is legal precedence which allows law authorities to 
get proper warrants for requesting more information about users using that particular ISP.  
Gonzales, Schofield and Hagy [23] demonstrate the following list of potential information that 
can be acquired: 
 ISP account information – all information relating to the user’s account with the 
service provider (for e.g. name, billing, maintenance notes, caller line 
identification number, etc.) 
 Email address information – all information relating to the user’s email address 
including the address itself, to whom it is associated,  the password if it is on file, 
etc. 
 Internet protocol address information – all information regarding the Internet 
Protocol (IP) details including to whom and when it was registered when 
successful connections were made 
 Domain name information – all the information relating to the identification of the 
user that registered and manages a specific domain on file 
 Web page information – all information relating to the identification of the user 
that created and manages a specific web page hosted by the service provider 
 Telnet session providers – IP history and Telnet logs of the user that made use of 
the Telnet service for specified time and date 
 Point-of-presence information – all the information relating to the Point-of-
presence (POP) that issued IP configuration to the user for a specific date and 
time 
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 Outgoing telephone records – all information relating to the telephone service 
employed by the user if subscribed and details of usage (for e.g. outgoing call 
logs, incoming call logs, voicemail, etc.) 
A forensic examiner may also make use of network forensic tools such as WireShark listed by 
Rafique and Khan [61] which focuses on the analysis of specific network data.  Gonzales, 
Schofield and Hagy [23] mention network elements such as packets and for simplicity, packets 
can be summarized as the embodiment of data traveling over the internet.  They contain the data 
and metadata in regards to where content is headed and sourced from.  Such network elements 
will contain potential evidence when it comes to solving a case with online connectivity 
involved.   
 Overall, all these details combined can help a forensic examiner assemble the pieces 
much better for finding out more information about the users themselves or getting a lead as to 
where to look for more evidence. 
 
3.4 Challenges in Digital Forensics 
The constant growth of the Information Technology industry is enabling many more 
advancements in this sector but this does hinder digital forensics.  As per Al Fahdi, Clarke and 
Furnell [1], this will bring technical challenges (such as anti-forensics, steganography, 
encryption, compression which will further be elaborated in this chapter), legal challenges (such 
as jurisdiction issues) and resource challenges (such as larger amounts of data to acquire and 
analyze). This is simply an overall generalization but Zareen, Waqar and Aslam [80] provide 
much more detail in regards to specific issues, especially on the technical and resource aspects.  
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The following list applies to the overall field of forensics including mobile and network forensics 
presented by Zareen, Waqar and Aslam [80]: 
 Data protection – storage units and individual chips can be fully encrypted and/or 
access to devices locked due to passwords 
 Data volatility – live memory acquisition techniques required to ensure all data 
off RAM modules is extracted if a suspect device is found in powered on state 
 Operating System variety – many varieties and flavors of operating systems 
available for multiple devices which can hinder some forensic tools and methods 
 Proprietary hardware – for mobile devices, no standards for data and power cables 
and respective interfaces therefore many cables could be required to extract data 
off the device 
 Hardware changes – for mobile devices, constant change of hardware with newer 
functions (sometimes added proprietary ones such as new iPhones and iOS 
password encryption) which sometimes limits compatibility with certain tools and 
applications 
 Application diversity – forensic tools and applications needed for many different 
application and program data sets due to their easy and diverse availability online.  
 Source synchronization – coupling of devices due to synchronization services and 
functions (e.g. smartphone and computer) 
 Third party services – information stored elsewhere through other services based 
on functionality of different applications and source device (e.g. emails, instant 
messages, call logs, etc.) 
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 Short-lived information – Data stored online changes at fast rates therefore a 
forensic investigator would need to be quick to acquire it if required 
 Quantum of network traffic – limitations to capturing full network data sets due to 
extremely high loads therefore can only be done in segments 
 Wireless Networks – malicious activity on wireless networks due to high 
availability and easier access through masquerade and clandestine methodologies 
which can hinder forensic examinations 
To further elaborate on wireless network related challenges and for an example of an issue in 
digital forensics and its specific challenges, Mutanga et al. [46] discuss the challenges in regards 
to evidence acquisition through wireless ad-hoc networks.  As previously mentioned, wireless 
networks are prominent in modern infrastructure to their offered capabilities.  Forensic 
examiners will have to face more situations where wireless networks could potentially be 
involved in their forensic investigation.  Mutanga et al. [46] present these challenges as followed: 
 Mobility – wireless ad-hoc networks incorporate mobility due to its nature so it is 
hard for forensic analysts to determine the exact number of nodes within a 
wireless network at any given time since connections and disconnections happen 
whenever due to the range of these networks.  Accuracy of collected data can also 
change due to the proportioned rate of distance to nodes and transmission errors 
 Existing security mechanisms – due to implemented security methods and 
mechanisms in wireless networks to prevent its malicious use and  having 
vulnerabilities exploited, it becomes harder for forensic examiners to remain 
anonymous or not viewed as a malicious node since evidence needs to be 
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collected and the network may perceive this as illegitimate actions.  Nodes can 
also be impersonated therefore this hinders the process and adds false positives 
 Topology changes – wireless ad-hoc networks can undergo topology changes at 
any moment due to its mobile nature and this will cause membership issues.  A 
forensic investigator will attempt to determine them and the state of the network 
based on past events which may be challenging by itself 
 Unreliable channels – high mobility networks have higher rate of packet loss 
therefore potential evidence could also not be lost in the retrieval process 
 Multi-hop communications – wireless ad-hoc networks incorporate multiple hops 
between users therefore tracing the source of data can be tricky.  Data can also be 
modified by one of these hops, especially if a malicious one, which could also be 
an accomplice of the suspect in an investigation 
 Low power devices – wireless access nodes can be low power devices so power 
constraints are an issue as well as data storage constraints for them due to the 
power ones.  Efficient data collection methods must be developed and/or 
employed by the forensic investigator to properly retrieve information 
 Inter-operability with other networks – it is desirable for wireless ad-hoc networks 
to function with other types of networks for added functionality therefore tracing 
the source of a crime is more difficult due to other network types factoring inside 
the environment 
The details presented by Mutanga et al.[46] showcase that even specific forensic environments 
have their own set of issues and challenges that needs to be addressed. 
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 Although a forensic examiner is faced with many challenges, there are many methods, 
applications, tools and combination of them that can help solve these issues and by knowing the 
limitations, a better solution and approach can be taken. 
3.4.1 Anti-Forensics. 
This section of the chapter will briefly explain the concept of anti-forensics which, as the 
name suggests, relates to methods and techniques for hindering and compromising forensic 
analysis.  There exist simple ways to do this as explained by Wundram, Freiling and Moch [76].  
Three simple to employ methods are encryption, compression, steganography or a combination 
of them.  Encryption simply put is the method of changing data to unreadable format with a 
specific key (e.g. a password) that can encrypt and decrypt the data.  Compression is the method 
of compacting data to save space on storage devices and alters the content of the target file(s) to 
accomplish this.  Steganography is simply the technique used to hide a particular file into another 
one, mainly using multimedia files as the source of concealment due to their large size according 
to Raghavan [62].  These methods have been around for a while but more complex ones have 
presented themselves to hinder forensic processes.  Wundram, Freiling and Moch [76] elaborate 
further on the goals and target of an attacker/suspect and are listed as followed: 
 Attacker’s goal 
o Avoidance of investigation through evidence removal or creation 
altogether 
o Delay of the investigation with manipulation of evidence 
 Attacker’s target 
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o Evidence itself – the attacker can try to erase, encrypt and hide data 
altogether or have large amounts of unnecessary data and use unusual 
hardware 
o Forensic tools – code injection in the forensic tools, buffer overflow 
exploits, directory loop attacks and changing hash sums in hash databases 
o Forensic examiner – pre-contamination of device with forensic traces and 
well as timestamp manipulation 
Malicious file system loops and injections attacks are more sophisticated techniques that can 
further hinder the overall forensic process.  As per Wundram, Freiling and Moch [76], a 
malicious file system loop has the objective of manipulating entries in the device’s file system 
which point to resources on the storage devices.  By changing these values, the operating system 
may remain in a loop state and this will stop it from executing necessary commands to boot or 
load specific information.  Code injection on forensic tools has the objective of infecting 
legitimate software for it to report false information.  Wundram, Freiling and Moch [76] present 
an example where the report generating tool of a hacked application executes any command that 
was written in a specific file accessed by the software.  In this case, the entire device can be 
compromised.  Knowledge of these concepts are important due to the fact that suspects may use 
any means available in attempts of not pleading guilty to computer related charges.  Forensic 
examiners must remain vigilant when facing all the challenges relating to digital forensics. 
 With all of this said and done, digital forensics will become a continuously harder process 
as time goes on. As per Garfinkel [19], the methodologies required to acquire and parse 
information will be harder to come by as more formats are developed; encryption will also 
become a huge hindrance as these schemes become more and more complex (if possible to solve 
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at all in the first place that is).  Another factor that Garfinkel [19] mentions is the management of 
data; storage standards are becoming larger and large by the months and it can take weeks to do 
one simple acquisition off a device which could be problem.  This is why continuous research 
efforts and methodologies must be developed for forensic examiners so that their work flow is 
alleviated and as much information as possible can be successfully acquired and parsed. 
 
3.5 Mobile Forensics  
Mobility within the technology realm has increasingly become more popular, efficient 
and necessary due to many business and technological processes.  Traditionally, digital forensics 
involve a “static” environment, so to speak, where one investigates large, on-site devices that 
cannot be moved that easily or hidden.  With the evolution of the mobile device and embedded 
functionalities and more advanced components, these devices can be anywhere (including on the 
suspect/user) and hold a multitude of information, if not more than a desktop/laptop computer; 
most mobile devices have embedded GPS hardware to track the location of the user, may it be 
for safety, navigation of application reasons.  The ability to browse the Internet anywhere has 
majorly contributed to the ever expanding market of cellular/mobile devices as shown by He et 
al [28].  This trend also applies to criminal activities as these devices enable them to 
communicate and coordinate more easily as shown by Carney [9].  The following sections 
focuses on the mobile forensic aspects and delivers an overview of what to expect when it comes 
to acquiring information off mobile devices. 
3.5.1 Mobile Forensics Overview 
Over the years, mobile devices have evolved beyond a linear trend; starting off as 
simplistic devices that use integrated circuits to send simple SMSs and phone calls to become 
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full fledge mobile computers (also known as smartphones).  Although the devices are smaller 
and less powerful than traditional desktop/laptop computers, Barmpatsalou et al. [5] discuss that 
the forensic acquisition methods are the same as digital forensics performed on traditional 
computers.  The three main types are: 
 Manual – manually browsing through the device to see what is contained on it 
(may also use a camera to capture pictures) 
 Logical – forensic tool extracts all known files and directories on the file system 
of the device 
 Physical – bit by bit copy of the device storage to access all potential information 
stored on the device 
Although manual extraction is prone to human error and potentially alternating data, which is not 
forensically sound, it should only be considered as an alternative approach and also as a 
validation technique against forensic tool interpreted data.  Logical and physical acquisitions are 
the best methodologies to extract information on mobile device as the data integrity is preserved 
and a lot more information can be recovered due to the functions performed by such acquisition 
methods. 
 Just like ordinary computers, mobile devices are available in a flavor of different 
operating systems due to the complex nature of the devices, not to mention multiple 
manufacturers that offer different features and functionality.  Although the market for phones is 
fierce, Android operated devices are the most popular among the competition according to 
Barmpatsalou et al. [5].  Other popular operating systems are Apple’s iOS, Blackberry’s QNX 
and Windows Mobile.  It is also important to note that Android, iOS and Windows Mobile are 
capable of being given root level privileges through “rooting”/”jailbreaking” methods, which 
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accesses protected areas of the operating system for added functionalities as reported by 
Barmpatsalou et al. [5].  These methods can play a role when it comes to accessing and 
extracting information with forensic tools which is discussed in section 4.4 Acquisition Methods 
and Observed Data in a later chapter of this paper. 
 Unlike desktop and laptop computers, mobile devices do not employ traditional hard 
drives to store data.  Barmpatsalou et al. [5] mention NAND flash memory is the main 
component for storing information as it is compact and highly efficient for these devices that 
require high storage capabilities.  Contrary to hard drives, these are integrated on the device 
component board itself and cannot be removed like a hard drive.  This sometimes makes 
extraction of data more difficult and would require the chip to be sanded off the component 
board (known as a “chip-off which can be done through heated and non-heated methods), 
explained by Ayers, Brothers and Jansen [4].  The chip can then be connected to specialized chip 
readers for direct access to the data if required since this is a destructive method (the mobile 
device would no longer work after the flash memory is removed).  This method is known to be 
extremely delicate and complicated since interaction with the NAND chip is required and it 
could be damaged in the process.  Ayers, Brothers and Jansen [4] also discuss Joint Action Test 
Group (JTAG), another method which is similar to performing a “chip-off” but in a non-
destructive matter in most cases. Standards and methodologies are developed to access the data 
on the flash memory chips through use of the component board itself.  As an example, a special 
connector is connected to the component board (component boards will have input pins on the 
board for debugging purposes… these can be used for data extraction).  These two methods are 
considered to as a hardware solution for forensic extraction but should not be overlooked as they 
are effective with mobile devices and the nature of their storage.  It is also important to mention 
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that mobile devices such as cellular phones make use of a Subscriber Identifier Module (SIM) 
card. These cards allow SIM-enabled devices to communicate with a cellular service provider 
and stores information such as device contacts, SMS/MMS data, its unique identifier serial 
number, etc.  As shown by Canlar et al. [8], SIM cards used to be the main focus of forensic 
efforts but due to the evolution of mobile devices, more sophisticated tools needed to be 
developed to perform all types of data extractions, including the SIM card as it still holds 
valuable information. 
 Another challenge discussed by Barmpatsalou et al. [5] that forensic examiners may face 
when it comes to mobile devices is the use of password/lock screens and encryption of the 
devices themselves to protect the data stored on the device.  Just like a traditional computer, 
these devices may be subjected to this and makes a forensic acquisition harder, unless the device 
is still unlocked/turned on.  A logical acquisition of any live device will allow access to its files 
and directories, not to mention acquiring the memory (RAM) of the device.  This potentially 
allows recovery of encryption keys/passwords that would negate the encryption.  External media 
cards can also be encrypted in the same fashion as most mobile devices allow storage expansion 
through them.  These techniques must be kept in mind as it may hinder forensic processes and 
data gathering due to the evolving encryption standards and features of mobile devices since 
security and privacy are built-in aspects within the realm of computerized devices since they are 
highly mobile. 
3.5.1.1 Deleted Artifacts 
 Following the trend of mobility, it has been shown by Glisson et al. [21] that mobile 
devices hold various data about its users.  Due to this nature and somewhat limited storage 
compared to traditional hard drives, data is moved around more as well as deleted.  This could 
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cause issues when trying to recover data, especially from a logical standpoint.  Glisson et al. 
[21]’s research objective was to determine whether a phone can tell anything about its previous 
owners after they attempt to completely wipe their phones.  A physical acquisition methodology 
would be needed to ensure that deleted data could be recovered (assuming the unallocated space 
where the data is stored is not overwritten).  Many phones of different brands, price ranges, 
version models and operating systems were acquired by Glisson et al. [21] for the sample.  It is 
important to note that all of these devices were second-hand therefore had been previously 
owned and data had been wiped.  Three forensic kits (either hardware/software solution or purely 
software based) were used for the acquisition of data stored on the phones: 
 Cellebrite’s Universal Forensic Extraction Device kit (UFED) 
 XRY Forensics’ Examination kit 
 Radio Tactics’ ACESO kit 
Initially, the use of these data kits was attempted to acquire the mobile device data using no SIM 
cards.  If that did not work, a cloned SIM card was used and if that failed, the original SIM card, 
if present, was used.  This specific approach and process allowed Glisson et al. [21] to determine 
the limitations of the extraction processes based on what components they had; they replicated 
many scenarios which potential buyers could have access to the old SIM card or not.  Table 1 
shows the total amount of recovered artifacts after they have supposedly been wiped off the 
phones.  The results shown by Glisson et al. [21] clearly demonstrate that data remnants on 
mobile devices reside after deleting the original content (in this case, sensitive content was 
obtained by them).  This process helps establish that infotainment system would also hold the 
information on storage if not overwritten. Second-hand vehicles and respective infotainment 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 53 
systems possess operating systems that are based off mobile variants due to the mobility of both 
types of devices. 
 
Table 1. Categorization of recovered artifacts [21] 
 
 
3.5.1.2 Forensic Tool Variance 
It is important to know that even though many tools are available for mobile forensic 
acquisition, not all of them do the same job and/or or produce the same results.  Glisson, Storer 
and Buchanan-Wollaston [20] discuss in their paper the variance between different tools and the 
different acquisition techniques; in this case physical, logical and manual.  Three toolkits were 
compared in terms of forensic ability: 
 Cellebrite’s Universal Forensic Extraction Device kit (UFED) 
 XRY Forensics’ Examination kit 
 Radio Tactics’ ACESO kit 
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From these three toolkits, Glisson, Storer and Buchanan-Wollaston [20] subjected them all to a 
logical acquisitions, XRY and UFED to a physical one and ACESO to a manual one.  Although 
each toolkit reported a high successful recovery rate (over 90%) on the artifacts they discovered, 
this does not mean they reported the same quantity of artifacts; unseen data remnants do not 
count as part of the recovery rate as they were not attempted to be recovered.  Glisson, Storer and 
Buchanan-Wollaston [20] reported that XRY was the most successful tool being the only one to 
have the logical and physical acquisition recover more than half of the total amount of artifacts 
found by all the toolkits.  This is important to note as this still does not mean that XRY would be 
the best solution as artifact verifiability needs to be taken into account; the same artifact found by 
more than one toolkit and missing artifacts than one toolkit recovered and another did not.  This 
work demonstrates that more than one methodology is needed to detect all potential data 
remnants and information on any device as this does not only apply to mobile forensics due to 
the nature of computers and these forensic tools. 
3.5.2 Windows Mobile Forensics Overview 
An overview of a Windows enabled mobile device is given in this section as some 
infotainment devices are based off Windows Automotive (Windows OS based off Windows CE).   
Current Windows mobile phones are all based off the same architecture and base kernel as 
discussed by Schaefer, Hofken and Schuba [66].  According to them, Windows 7 for mobile 
devices is based off on the Windows CE 6 kernel.  As any other modern operating system, 
Windows 7 offers these mobile devices  the use of a web browser, multimedia applications, 
social media application, contact integration, etc.  In their work, Schaefer, Höfken and Schuba 
[66] mention that one method to extract data from the phone is to create and install an 
application in the phone itself that would send stored data to a connected device with little 
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change to the data itself.  This approach has risks as it requires elevated privileges for access to 
large volumes of data and can potentially overwrite protected data but changes can be 
documented to ensure data accuracy and that all modifications are accounted for.  Mobile 
application developers for this OS are given limited rights (concept of least privileged applied to 
developers).  The researchers can achieve higher access rights through the use of manufacturer 
Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) that native applications use.  This would allow developer 
applications methods for elevated calls.  At first, the custom application built imports the 
“Windows.Phone.interopService” DLL which gives access to the "RegisterComDLL" method.  
This function allows for further DLL importing, specifically manufacturer DLLs.  With the use 
of ChevronWP7, a tool that can be used on a jailbroken phone, the Microsoft publishing process 
is circumvented and application use on the phone is allowed.  Schaefer, Höfken and Schuba [66] 
made use of a community developed application called TouchXperience and a custom developed 
application entitled Una, both using client-server architecture with the server running Zune based 
software.  The server would receive data from the phone, order it and present it in human 
readable form.  Read, write and executive rights as well as access to the entirety of the Windows 
based file system were granted to the users.  TouchXperience had slight limitations while Una 
had less including access to general device information, running processes and the registry.  
Virtually all the data stored on the phone was accessible through this method.  All of this was 
achieved on a HTC Trophy 7 smartphone.  The research discussed by Grispos, Storer and 
Glisson [25] demonstrate that data artifacts can be recovered without your own custom built 
solution.  UFED, as mentioned above, is a well-known tool capable of doing such extractions 
and works well with Windows enabled devices as shown by Grispos, Storer and Glisson [25].  
Access to registry files, internet history, pictures and videos (acquired through carving or not) 
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and more would be of great value and some of these tools can help achieve that, if not all.  
Theoretically speaking, this would also be possible on Windows based infotainment systems 
embedded into vehicles if the correct methods and tools are used and depending on the 
generation employed.  This is important as current on road Ford manufactured vehicles make use 
of their SYNC infotainment platform, which run Windows Automotive.  Some aftermarket 
infotainment systems run off Windows CE so similar methods may be applied. 
Canlar et al. [8] demonstrated additional techniques of mobile device forensics and data 
acquisition on Windows based phones.  The tool created by this research is called LiveSD 
Forensics.  With the use a custom-built tool developed by Canlar et al. [8] and HaRET (Linux 
based kernel) stored inside an Secure Digital (SD) card, live data acquisition off the mobile 
device’s RAM can be done as well on Electrically Erasable  Programmable Read-Only Memory 
(EEPROM) chip data access.  The only physical step that needs to be done is to plug the SD card 
inside a phone that has an SD slot.  Here is a list of what LiveSD Forensics can achieve based off 
the work of Canlar et al.[8]: 
 RAM acquisition 
 EEPROM acquisition 
 On-device acquisition 
 Control over running processes 
 Minimal memory footprint 
When HaRET is initiated, the Windows OS state is frozen so that the Linux OS can boot.  To 
ensure no data is overwritten in the RAM, it is dumped onto the SD card for preservation.  
EEPROM is also secured against data tampering since HaRET reads and writes only to the SD 
card so data stored on EEPROM is simply read through the custom-built tool’s calls.  The results 
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shown put further emphasis that the Windows based environment is vulnerable to data 
acquisition and these can transfer over to vehicle employing Windows Automotive for 
infotainment systems.  Access to live memory gives access to all types of information on a 
mobile device as its functions are the limit of what types of data that can be extracted: 
 Pictures  
 Videos 
 SMS/MMS data 
 Username 
 Passwords  
 Emails  
 Etc.   
This type of information is a gold mine for forensic analysts as live memory acquisitions are not 
normally encrypted if the acquisition is possible and successfully completed.  Canlar et al. [8] 
help put in perspective the level of access that can be obtained by well-crafted applications and 
forensic utilities.  The ability to perform such tasks through SD cards is noteworthy as another 
methodology to consider when performing forensic acquisition processes. 
3.5.3 Cloud-based Forensics 
With such an architecture implemented, millions of network objects would be added on 
top of daily Internet traffic so the logical choice for application handling would be web based.  
The work presented by Quick and Choo [60] present possibilities of acquiring data remnants on 
mobile devices and computers that use cloud storage applications, specifically in this case, 
Google Drive.  With the use of an iPhone 3G and a hard drive used by 36 Virtual Machine (VM) 
instances running different browsers, the analysis was undertaken.  Multiple forensic toolkits 
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were used as well as WireShark (a tool for Internet traffic analysis) since communication 
between the cloud service and base machine is a core aspect of cloud storage.  Four browsers on 
a Windows 7 PC were also tested to determine if some would reveal more information than 
others: 
 Internet Explorer 
 Mozilla Firefox 
 Google Chrome 
 Apple Safari 
Based off the tests perform when accessing data on the cloud or storing it, many temporary files 
and links are created and kept on the file system as Quick and Choo [60] have documented.  
Files such as “snapshot.db” and “sync_config.db” are easily recoverable and contain path 
information to where files are downloaded and synchronized as well as URL access links, file 
sizes, checksum values and resource IDs.  Through most cases, usernames can be found in clear 
text in these files and while doing live web traffic analysis.  Account passwords are also 
disclosed through the use of Internet Explorer and its temporary files it creates.  Live RAM 
analysis has also disclosed the passwords of users using Google Chrome, Internet Explorer and 
Mozilla Firefox.  Similar tests were also done on Microsoft’s SkyDrive (now known as 
OneDrive) and Dropbox.  Key files similar to “snapshot.db” and “sync_config.db” were found as 
well as the disclosure of usernames and passwords.  Table 2 below displays a summary of these 
results.  The results shown here are important for vehicular forensics research as vehicles will 
make use of such services directly or indirectly, not limited to Google Drive, Microsoft’s 
OneDrive and Dropbox.  These results show that many remnants of data can be found so 
temporary files and cached data must be regularly wiped although Quick and Choo [60] have 
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demonstrated that they have been able to locate data remnants after running applications such as 
“CCleaner” and “Eraser.”  These programs’ functionalities are mainly for deleting temporary 
Internet files, history, cache and such so being able to recover such artifacts shows forensic 
potential.  
Table 2. Summary of online cloud services data remnants [60] 
 
As discussed in this chapter’s section, mobile forensics are becoming increasingly 
popular due to the fact that virtually everyone has a mobile device to the many functionalities 
offered by them.  The concepts discussed can apply to any type of mobile platform since the 
operating systems used to power them are a basis of popular known ones which have been 
already tried and tested forensically.  The application of these processes to infotainment systems 
could leverage results in theory and must be kept in mind due to the impact it could bring to 
criminal courts with the involvement of telephones in crimes as shown by Carney [9] and their 
potential interactions with vehicles.  Vehicles are already accessories to crimes in some cases 
therefore different methodologies must be considered and attempted to extract information on 
them. 
 
3.6 Android Forensics 
Operating systems demonstrate great relevance when it comes to the fields of forensics as 
the more that an OS penetrates a market in terms of popularity, the more that its file structure and 
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architecture is known and studied.  This leads to the development of many tools and specialized 
software packages for forensic purposes/data acquisition and parsing.  This is especially the case 
when it comes to open source OSs such as the Android platform.  Since its inception in 2008, 
Jovanovic and Redd [31] mentions that the push for open source enables many manufacturers to 
adapt to it as it cuts down costs for software production.  This is a problem as different hardware 
is interfaced with varying software as manufacturers develop their own distributions of Android.  
This section of this chapter will give an overview of forensics relating to the Android operating 
system since it is widely popular and available for all types of platforms including infotainment 
platforms. 
3.6.1 Android Forensics Overview 
The Android operating system was developed by a coalition of over 50 mobile 
technology giants ranging from phone manufacturers to software developers and such (for e.g., 
Google, Intel, HTC, Acer, Sprint, T-Mobile, etc.).  This collaboration effort was known as the 
Open Handset Alliance (OHA) as discussed by Lessard and Kessler[36].  The OHA’s main 
objective was to offer a standardized platform so that the end user can have an overall better 
experience with mobile devices.   
When it comes to obtaining information off the Android device, it can be stored in 
multiple locations according to Jovanovic and Redd [31].  NAND flash storage, SD cards or 
even on the device’s connected network.  The data that can be recovered through logical or 
physical acquisition ranges as followed: 
 Multimedia collection 
 SMS/MMS 
 Contacts 
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 Call Logs 
 GPS coordinates 
 Internet browsing history 
 Application Data 
 Etc. 
This goes without saying that live memory acquisition of these devices also gives access to 
information such as relevant application data, encryption keys, usernames, passwords and system 
services information as discussed by Jovanovic and Redd [31].  Android systems are also 
susceptible to the same hardware forensic techniques mentioned in the prior mobile forensics 
section, such as JTAG and chip-off since NAND/EEPROM flash storage is the main method of 
storing information on these compact devices.  Commercial forensic software can also be used to 
extract such information (this does not exclude freeware solutions).  Lessard and Kessler [36] 
have achieved successful forensic acquisition processes with the use of UFED which extracted a 
multitude of information including SMS/MMS, contacts information, call logs and multimedia 
files.  This demonstrates that many methodologies are widely available to extract information off 
Android based platforms and devices. 
3.6.1.1 General Acquisition 
The Android operating system, just like other mobile devices, makes use of NAND flash 
memory chips to store information due to the small size but high capacity of this component 
type.  Most Android systems make use of the Memory Technology Devices (MTD) system 
discussed by Vidas, Zhang and Christin [72].  This shows all memory access points as a single 
interface.  Specific Linux utilities (for e.g., NAND dump) can be used to dump the data off MTD 
enabled NAND flash memory and if not the case, the built-in “dd” utility (tool that copies data 
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bit-by-bit in raw format) works and grabs all data from every memory block.  Vidas, Zhang and 
Christin [72] also mention that data might be missing from the extraction process if an SD card is 
within the device as some application/user data might be stored there depending on which 
programs are installed on the device and their configuration parameters. 
The MTD system itself is divided into multiple partitions for segregating types of data in 
the Android phone.  Regardless of the file system, EXT4 for newer devices or Yet Another Flash 
File System 2 (YAFFS2), six partitions are typically found on the device: 
 System 




 PDS (configuration data) 
These partitions depend on the manufacturer and extent of functionalities of the device as there 
might be more than six as displayed in Table 3 below shown by Vidas, Zhang and Christin [72]. 
 To actually perform the entire process of MTD block extraction, there are certain 
prerequisites required on the Android phone to gain access to the MTD system directly.  
Specifically, Android Debugging (ADB) must be enabled and the device most be rooted as 
shown by Lessard and Kessler [36].  ADB enables a host system (in this case, a forensic 
examiner’s forensic computer) to connect to the Android device and communicate with it.  
ADB’s functionalities also range from transferring data freely between devices, sending 
commands from the host device, debugging the Android device’s outputs, browsing its entire file 
system, etc.  ADB can be enabled through “Developer Options” in the system settings menu in 
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the Android device by toggling the option on.  Once it is turned on and the lock screen is 
bypassed, the device may be connected to the host to start communication session.  Lessard and 
Kessler [36] mention the Android Development Tools (ADT) which are part of the Android 
Software Development Kit (SDK) and these tools are used by the host machine to detect 
connected ADB enabled devices.  The ADT is composed of tools/utilities that will give root 
access to the user once executed as performed by Lessard and Kessler [36].  Once this process is 
complete, the forensic examiner could shell into the device and have root access to all files (not 
just the files within the file system).  From this point on, “NAND dump” or “dd” could be 
executed to perform a physical acquisition off the MTD partitions.  Due to the open source 
nature and available developer tools/kits for the Android platform, this method in general should 
always work when it comes to extracting information off any MTD-enabled system due to the 
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Table 3. General layout and purpose of Android MTD blocks [72] 
 
 
3.6.1.2 Live Memory Acquisition 
As mentioned above by Jovanovic and Redd [31], live memory recovery is important as 
it holds a multitude of information in regards to user data: authentication credentials and 
encryption keys being the most notable.  Ntantogian et al. [47] have used Linux Memory 
Extractor (LiME), an open source forensic tool used for live memory acquisition of Android 
devices.  They took a memory dump of a mobile device running thirteen different applications 
that can be separated in the following four categories: 
 Mobile banking applications 
 Financial/online shopping applications 
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 Password Managers 
 Data hiding and encryption applications 
The important observations made by Ntantogian et al. [47] was that most passwords and 
usernames could be recovered in plain text format through the live acquisition process.  This 
presents great opportunities for forensic examiners to identify potential users and accessing more 
information if required.  The only issue is that such information can be overridden once 
application “log-in” is complete; opening any other application or service may delete this data so 
it is paramount that a forensic examiner acquires the RAM dump as soon as possible as pointed 
out by Ntantogian et al. [47].  It is important to note that this type of extraction pulls more than 
just passwords and usernames and such information can be just as valuable to a forensic 
examiner, therefore these types of extractions need to be attempted whenever the opportunity 
arises due to the volatility of the data.   
3.6.1.3 Live SD Acquisition 
The use of external storage methods can also help achieve a physical acquisition of an 
Android device (assuming certain features are enabled on the device).  Chen, Yang and Liu [11] 
make use of the HTC Desire in their research to run a physical dump process disguised as an 
Android OS update through the built-in “Recovery Mode” of the device.   This mode is used to 
revert the mobile device to previous versions if the operating system crashes.  Chen, Yang and 
Liu’s [11] process involved inserting the tool within an SD card and then into the mobile device.  
The HTC smartphone was then rebooted and launched into “Recovery Mode” and then selecting 
the update option as the Android OS detects the “update.zip” file (Android recognizes any file as 
the “update” file if it is named “update.zip”… if the device is also rooted, any distribution of 
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Android could be installed).  This method of extraction is highly effective if a forensic examiner 
only has portable forensic tools on external media as it offers a more “mobile” solution if needed. 
3.6.2 Instant Messaging Forensics 
Many types of application exist on mobile devices for communication sessions between 
users, may it be for sending emails, accessing social media accounts, SMS/MMS and one finally 
instant messaging applications.  The latter offers one of the most effective way of 
communication in terms of speed as well as the popularity it has among all mobile devices users.  
WhatsApp, being the most distributed one among all platforms, especially Android, was acquired 
by Facebook as shown by Anglano [2]; there is over 400 million active users with billions of 
messages sent on a daily basis.  Mahajan, Dahiya and Sanghvi [40] also mention of the Viber 
application with over 140 million active users which is still a considerable amount of users 
among all instant messaging applications.  Both were evaluated by Mahajan, Dahiya and 
Sanghvi [40] due to their popularity.  Although their basis service is the same, WhatsApp offers 
more functionality than Viber and ae as followed: 
 Text messages 
 Sending/receiving pictures 
 Sending/receiving videos 
 Sending/receiving audio clips 
 Directly sharing contact information 
 Group chat 
 Voice call 
 GPS coordinates 
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3.6.2.1 Viber User Data 
 Viber does offer free text messaging and voice call through data usage as WhatsApp 
requires a subscription fee to make use of its services.  It is important to note that the Viber 
application makes use of a unique “Viber number” to associate the user’s mobile device number 
to the application and both are linked to one another.  Through the use of a Cellebrite UFED 
toolkit, Mahajan, Dahiya and Sanghvi [40] established that Viber made use of three databases to 
store all of the application’s user data: 
 Viber_call_log.db – stores call logs 
 Viber_data (directory with multiple files) – stores Android metadata, phonebook 
contacts and data, Viber numbers and calls 
 Viber_messages (directory with multiple files) – Android metadata, messages, 
sqlite_sequence, threads and participants 
Their goal was to determine what exact information was stored on Android phones from using 
the applications (five in their case with varying version of the Android OS).  UFED ran its 
extraction process and managed to pull many types of information from the Viber application. 
The information could then be viewed with a “SQLite Database Browser” due to the files 
containing the information were formatted as .db files.  Examples of extracted information were 
recipient phone numbers, source phone numbers, plain text messages, timestamps, etc.  Table 4, 
shown below, displays all types of information found by Mahajan, Dahiya and Sanghvi [40] in 
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Table 4. Discovered artifacts on Viber [40] 
 
 
3.6.2.2 WhatsApp User Data 
As previously mentioned, WhatsApp has many functionalities when it comes to the 
application itself.  Group chat, voice call, sending/receiving multimedia and audio clips, 
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exchanging contact information from within the application and traditional text messages.  
Similar to Viber, Android stores database that would hold user data and is shown by Anglano [2]: 
 wa.db – contacts database 
 msgstore.db – chat database 
 msgstore.db.cryptmsgstore-<date>.crypt – encrypted backup of chat database 
 UID.j (UID is identifier of specific contact) – avatars of contacts and a backup 
 whatsapp.log / whatsapp-<date>.log – log files 
 *Various files* – used for storing sent/received files and user configuration for 
settings and preferences  
Compared to Viber, there is much more information stored on an Android device relating to 
WhatsApp data compared to Viber.  Anglano [2] did use a different approach instead of a 
commercial tool approach such as the use of Cellebrite’s UFED kit; Virtualization allowed 
Anglano [2] to create a software emulated Android device through the YouWave virtualization 
platform which is known to faithfully replicate Android device behavior. Android version 4.0.4 
was utilized as well as WhatsApp version 2.11.  Once the virtual environment and the application 
were setup, WhatsApp was used to generate random data to fill the application’s database for test 
data.  SQLiteman and Notepadd++ was used to view the user data; WhatsApp uses SQLite 
version 3 to store the information within its databases and textual files were produced as well.  
AccessData FTK Imager version 3.1 was used to then extract the contents of the virtualized 
environment, in this case the Android WhatsApp’s database files. 
 In the previously mentioned WhatsApp databases, Table 5, shown below by Anglano [2], 
gives a preview of what to expect in term of messages contents.  As displayed, information is 
shown based on the type of data that was sent or received.  Plain text messages are simply shown 
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within its respective field if the type was set as a text message; a link to data is provided if a 
multimedia file was sent or received.  Notice that longitude and latitude data is also displayed if a 
user was to send his coordinates to one or multiple contacts.  Figure 3, also shown below, gives 
an example of a multimedia file being sent and its respective metadata that can be found in the 
Android message database. 
Table 5. Messages table concerning content [2] 
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Figure 3. Multimedia file being sent [2] 
 
It is important to note that all other mentioned databases share the same features in terms of 
having the needed fields to identify information about relative user data, shown by Anglano [2] 
(for e.g., the wa.db contacts’ database contains fields that identify the name of contacts and their 
phone numbers).   
This clearly demonstrates that a forensic examiner could use instant messaging 
applications to pull information about a particular user and find out the activities the user 
engaged in and full communication sessions between persons of interest.  Many types of 
information are available ranging from potential GPS coordinates, text messages, 
senders/receivers’ information, phone numbers, links to multimedia files (or the files 
themselves), timestamps (found in message attribute tables as shown by Anglano [2]) and user 
settings and configuration parameters.  The importance of such data can be paramount in 
investigations and also helps identify persons of interest or users in general.  Infotainment 
systems constantly relay information between itself and connected devices so potential is to be 
found in information it could store.  
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3.6.3 Locational Data  
As more functionalities are embedded in the millions of mobile devices distributed 
worldwide, more applications are being tailored to make use of these utilities to their fullest 
extent.  An important aspect of mobility is localization (for e.g., GPS enabled 
devices/applications).  Kramer [34] discusses the relevance of this type of information in his 
research.  The prevalence of social media applications such as Facebook and Twitter encourages 
users to include their location in any activity they engage; this is especially true when pictures 
are involved as location data is normally embedded in EXIF data (meta-data about pictures taken 
with cameras).  Kramer [34] also mentions the use of Google enabled services (especially on 
Android devices) such as Google Maps, which work with exact longitudes and latitudes.  This 
gives a forensic examiner potential in retrieving exact GPS coordinates based on a user’s phone 
activity.  This can be particularly useful at linking someone to a specific location based on a 
specific event. 
Kramer [34] developed an application for retrieving localization data on Android devices 
called DroidSpotter.  Its main objective is to seek out locational information off any and every 
artifact of an Android-enabled platform (in his case, an Android image) and narrow that 
information down to feasible locations.  In his work, Kramer [34] used his personal Twitter 
account to send a tweet with locational services enabled.  A picture taken by his Android device 
with GPS enabled, was also attached to the tweet.  DroidSpotter recovered the longitude and 
latitude positions of the user when the tweet was sent; EXIF data from the picture could have 
also been used to determine such localization information.  Another example Kramer [34] 
provided was with the use of Google Maps.  When a user searches for destinations through this 
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service, multiple database are created on the device.  The following information was collected 
from these databases: 
 UNIX Timestamps 
 Name of Destination 
 Latitude and Longitude of Destination 
 Latitude and Longitude of Source 
 Search History 
The information recovered is quite relevant when trying to determine places that a user was 
attempting to go or has been to.  This searches can also help tie the user to a particular location, 
in this case potentially anywhere depending when and where he made the exact searches. 
 GPS related information does not just apply to Android-enabled devices as GPS 
systems/tracking devices can be embedded in virtually anything.  The importance of this data can 
be paramount when a specific location can be tied to a user. Forensic examiners must always 
hold this type of information as high value due to the implications they can bring.  With modern 
applications having localization used for enhanced usability, potential GPS breadcrumbs can be 
left everywhere inside digital evidence and can be used to clarify certain events in the forensic 
analysis process. 
 
3.7 Vehicular Forensics 
The current state of vehicular forensics is quite new considering how the field of digital 
forensics is fresh as a whole versus the already established traditional forensic methodologies 
which have been around for much longer.  With the addition of ECUs and more sophisticated 
systems such as infotainment platforms, more data is logged and stored in vehicles themselves.   
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Their high proprietary nature due to the amount of different manufacturers makes accessing this 
information not as straightforward as a traditional computer running known software on 
standardized formats.  This section of the thesis will present what has been done in the specific 
field of vehicular forensics as it is still an emerging field and vehicles will only contain more 
information in regards to themselves and their end users as more technology is embedded into 
them. 
3.7.1 Forensic Potential of Infotainment Systems 
Modern vehicles are becoming quite sophisticated in regards to current technologies in 
terms of internal components.  Once VANETs are fully implemented, the added layers of 
interconnectivity between vehicle objects will bring transportation to the technological frontier.  
Vehicles are now being embedded with high-end infotainment systems with the goal of 
facilitating driving with applications and services for user friendliness, efficiency and added 
security (for e.g., IntelliDrive, a third party device which monitors driver habits, can send 
notifications out to a third party insurance company if thresholds are broken).  These 
infotainment systems are also embedded with localization services and GPSs for easier 
navigation.  From that being said, it is only natural that these platforms will produce and 
circulate a lot of data such as media content between external devices, internal logging, 
localization data, etc.  The report written by Wall [74] suggests that third-party navigation 
systems have and are most likely collecting such information in terms of localization data only.  
There are many infotainment platforms currently deployed in the transportation market 
and are mostly proprietary: Ford SYNC, GM OnStar, BMW Assist, Lexus Enform, Toyota Safety 
Connect, Hyundai BlueLink, Infinity Connection, Etc.  These platforms are some of the 
interfaces offered to the end users when driving their vehicle.  These systems have the goal of 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 75 
making driving experiences user-friendly and give the driver and respective passengers’ constant 
connection to the vehicle.  Applications are offered to interact directly with the vehicle’s 
systems, for e.g., remote start and unlocking/locking doors.  Users can stream multimedia 
content from mobile devices for entertainment experience. On top of this, Thilakarathna, 
Petander, Mestre and Seneviratne [71] explain that social media applications such as Facebook 
and Twitter show prominence due to the increased usage of mobile devices and their capabilities, 
especially now that these mobile platforms are being integrated into vehicle functionalities and 
infotainment systems.  The combination of the former and latter will bring potential to 
streamlining application services within vehicles.  Work shown by Guo, Ahmed and Saddik [26] 
elaborates on how web services will be an integral part of vehicles since infotainment system are 
becoming increasingly popular and implemented by default into vehicles due to their utility and 
potential resourcefulness.  The Internet (and its access) will enable these systems to directly 
interact with web services for increased functionality and entertainment of end users within the 
vehicle.  Finally, Maaroufi and Pierre [39] discuss the potential of VSNs (Vehicular Social 
Networks) which is the embodiment of the aforementioned since it integrates mobile social 
media applications into vehicles, which would redefine its entire community and this would 
allow multiple functionalities and potential. 
A lookout for future Android-powered infotainment platforms must also be considered.  
Recently, many technological giants and vehicle manufacturers have formed a coalition entitled 
“Open Automotive Alliance” (for e.g. Google, NVIDIA, Ford, Dodge, etc. to name a few – see 
http://www.openautoalliance.net).  This coalition’s goal is to provide a common, open source 
platform for vehicles so that a seamless and safer experience is provided. 
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Cohen [13] specifically worked with Ford SYNC modules since the automaker developed 
high-end infotainment systems in its current market.  SYNC, as shown by Cohen [13], runs off a 
Windows-based operating system, Microsoft Automotive, also known as Windows CE. It also 
employs three generations of SYNC modules, first/second generation being with older vehicles 
compared to the third one.  It is important to note that Cohen’s [13] presentation refers to the 
third generation as the second one and the first/second generation refers to the first one.  This 
will simplify references of a more recent work that talks about these three generations, having 
the first and second combined.  The first/second generation (2007 – 2011 models) separates the 
SYNC and navigation modules.  The SYNC module stores phone related information since it 
interacts mainly with mobile devices.  The navigation module (main head unit with GPS) stores 
media files and navigation data through the use of a hard drive.  The third generation (2011 – 
2014/2015) integrates both the navigation unit and SYNC module into one and employs 
software-locked SD cards for data storage, wireless streaming with 802.11 technology and 
external media.  For first/second generation Ford infotainment modules, all the data of the SYNC 
module is stored on a NAND flash chip.  Cohen [13] shows that through chip extraction, SYNC 
data can be extracted through raw binary output.  It is important to note that the actual third 
generation of SYNC has been released and integrated in today’s current Ford models but not 
much is known as research is still underway to gain internal access in these modules. 
Illera and Vidal [30] showed how it is possible to extract data from Erasable 
Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) (discussed below), which allows for more input 
for data reconstruction.  Kopylova et al. [33]  have researched ways of reconstructing accident 
events more accurately through the use of an extended Event Data Recorder (EDR). They have 
shown four approaches to solidify EDRs: 
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1. In-vehicle application integration to improve log recording (for e.g., access to 
sensors and diagnostic modules) 
2. Include VANET communications for dynamics and localization of nearby 
vehicles while accident occurs 
3. GPS rectification through witness vehicle data 
4. Data sufficiency through rotating logs and use of “accident witness” and “self-
involved” crash reporting mechanism 
These added methods shown by Kopylova et al. [33] would make accident reconstruction better 
in terms of event accuracy and detail.  The latter, more specifically, uses a threaded approach so 
that multiple events can be reported at the same time if a vehicle is directly involved in a crash 
but can report details as a witness to other vehicles part of the accident.  Overall, all of these 
would ensure that all details from every perspective are communicated and stored when 
gathering information relating to the accident.  Since ECUs are accessible and contain data in 
non-volatile fashion, infotainment systems are suspected of storing information as well.  If 
infotainment information is also kept and stored, the driver’s actions and environment could 
potentially be determined (for e.g., multimedia volume strength, GPS breadcrumbs, end-
destination, etc.).  This would help assess an accident reconstruction event much better. 
3.7.2 Forensic Challenges in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
While remaining in the realm of helping authorities better determine event sequences, 
Mutanga et al. [46] pointed out to the challenges of acquiring evidence through digital forensics. 
Their research aims at finding better methods of doing so on wireless Ad-Hoc networks, 
VANETs obviously being taken in consideration in this case.  The work presented the added 
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challenges of evidence collection done onto these types of networks.  Here is a list of these 
issues: 
 Mobility – node localization is difficult due to network changes 
 Existing security mechanisms – forensics in malicious network are easily 
detectable 
 Topology changes – network state determination is difficult because of constant 
network condition changes 
 Unreliable channels – packet loss due to nature of wireless networks 
 Multi-hop communication – source of suspected traffic is difficult to trace 
 Low power devices – power constraints for data collection and data selection 
(except for VANET) 
 Interoperability – crime point of origin is difficult to determine 
Mutanga et al. [46] showed that Ad-Hoc networks in general give malicious users a simplified 
method of launching attacks from nodes as a source onto the Internet.  This makes it much harder 
to trace.  The use of infotainment system data might help determine points of origin through 
local GPS data acquisition, breadcrumb trails and end point destination.  The use of vehicle 
cameras might catch the perpetrator in the act (would most likely be using a computer device on 
board a vehicle or tampering with the controls on his vehicle).  Analyzing data remnants of 
applications used by the infotainment systems could also help determine the malicious user (for 
e.g., unknown application being used and/or illegitimate uses of legitimate applications).  
Carney [9] makes a case of mobile devices being used more extensively for forensic 
investigations due to the rise of mobile devices in criminal activities.  Although Carney’s [9] 
work is about mobile phone devices, the mobility aspect still applies to vehicles.  Just like mobile 
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device forensics, vehicular forensics is new and the concepts apply to either, as vehicles will be 
able to connect to mobile devices through Bluetooth, direct physical interfacing and Wi-Fi 
hotspots.  Vehicles could then store the same information, and mobile forensic laws could apply 
the same way so it is important to know what is being stored inside infotainment systems.  
Windows-based file systems are widespread across many types of computerized systems and 
having Ford SYNC utilize Microsoft Automotive as the base operating system makes plenty of 
information potentially accessible as Schaefer, Hofken and Schuba [66] have demonstrated 
through their custom- and community- built forensic tools.  In regards to localization data, which 
is of value to law enforcement for forensics and investigations, Hannay [27] makes a good case 
for the classification of such data.  Table 6 summarizes how localization data would be classified 
in accordance to type and confidentiality levels since vehicular data acquisition, especially from 
infotainment systems, would have legal boundaries and must be justified.  Some infotainment 
systems, such as Ford’s SYNC modules, have GPSs embedded into them when manufactured.  
Since the infotainment platform produces this type of data by design, it is clearly highly 
confidential.  It must be determined how this data is stored inside the vehicles, and for how long.   
Depending on the model and enabled functionalities, these devices will be capable of connecting 
to external platforms for connectivity such as WiFi and cellular carriers.  This can help identify 
information about a user and his or her whereabouts although in an indirect fashion.  Hannay 
[27] also points out the multitude amounts of metadata produced by current/future in-car 
applications as well as social media applications which can help place users behind certain 
actions if enough information is collected.  This is why boundaries must be determined, but 
methods to access and determine how the information is stored must also be established.  
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Table 6. Classification Summary [27] 
 
 
3.7.3 Recent Vehicular Forensic Efforts 
At this state and time, not much work has been put into digital forensics of vehicles, 
especially considering the use of infotainment system in modern vehicles.  Based off recent 
trends, security vulnerabilities seem to be the main focus for the research community in the 
overall field of VANETs and internal vehicle technologies.  Checkoway et al. [10], for example, 
demonstrate how the technology within vehicles can be exploited to compromise and control 
them.  Mejri and Ben-Othman [43] even mention that DoS attacks are more than likely to happen 
to disrupt legitimate services within vehicles and VANETs.  Many counter-measures must be 
deployed to ensure user safety hence why so much research is invested in the security portion of 
the field.  Wei, Yu, and Boukerche [75], for example, discuss such means of defense and 
protection with the use of trust based security methods so that interactions are properly evaluated 
when monitoring communications with third-parties.  With this in mind, this suggests why there 
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is a clear lack of documentation when it comes to the aforementioned forensic field.  This 
therefore raises the question of the potential of research that can be done in this specific field.  
Some of the first works that touched on vehicle forensics was presented at DEFCON 19 by 
Cohen [13].  The work demonstrated forensic techniques employed on the Ford SYNC 
platforms.  The researcher has shown vehicle modules can be tapped into to retrieve stored data.  
Chip extraction techniques of NAND flash proved to be successful using Data IO Flashpak III, 
which is a hardware-based solution.  Overall, regardless of the SYNC generation employed, 
different information can be extracted and is as follows: 
 Bluetooth-paired MAC IDs 
 Phone contacts and logs 
 SMS messages 
 Multimedia files (for e.g., pictures, audio files, videos) 
 Navigation data 
 Generic car information 
The work shown also hints that spare USB ports and JTAG ports are accessible.  Media and 
localization data can be retrieved through the on-board hard drive.  The work shows that 
reimaging the hard drive, exfiltration of data through the upload process and re-flashing the 
firmware are all successful methods of extracting data from the hard drive.  The second/third 
generation of SYNC, as mentioned earlier this chapter, integrates both the SYNC module and 
navigation unit using write-protected SD cards that contain the Windows-based OS.  If this 
specific card is not present, the navigation unit simply does not function as a failsafe.  Work 
shown by LeMere’s presentation [35] demonstrates that Ford SYNC third generation modules 
can have data extracted through traditional imaging tools and data analysis.  JTAG ports are also 
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hinted as a possibility and were being looked into for a streamlined solution.  Flash chips dumps 
are also achievable but require a custom-built solution, which was achieved by LeMere [35]. 
 Most vehicles on the road today make use of “black box” modules or a Crash Data 
Retrieval (CDR) function, also known as EDRs, to collect information pertaining to a vehicle 
crash occurring locally.  The CDR function/EDR stores the data on airbag ECUs since they are 
well protected as shown by Illera and Vidal [30]. This can be very useful for reconstructing 
accident events. Illera and Vidal [30] gave a presentation at DEFCON 21 showing how they were 
able to successfully develop custom hardware at very low cost to read and write data to/from 
these modules and showed what is needed to build them.  Proceeding with this, information kept 
from the CDR function relates to the vehicle’s speed, accelerator pedal position, brake use, 
revolutions per minute (RPM), etc.  When an accident occurs, the data collected by the 
EDR/CDR function is dumped onto the EEPROM of the airbag ECU.  The presentation points 
out that there are three ways to retrieve this dumped data: 
1. Extraction through OBD II port and CAN bus (authentication required) 
2. Extraction through airbag ECU module (authentication required) 
3. Direct extraction from EEPROM module (no authentication required) 
From what Illera and Vidal [30] showed, ECU authentication is not hard to break, but it is much 
easier without authentication. The presentation showed that the software to analyze the data 
dumps is free to download but in need of a parser if you do not want to buy expensive hardware 
that would come with the software.  Luckily, their custom hardware comes into play and allows 
for direct integration of the EEPROM chip for data extraction.  The first two methods can also be 
achieved with this custom hardware since Illera and Vidal [30] show how to break the seed 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 83 
authentication process. These techniques demonstrate that data retrieval of non-volatile 
components is possible. 
 Although research is limited compared to other vehicle related fields such as VANETs, 
the information provided by the aforementioned work shows promise and potential that 
infotainment systems can store information within its storage components.  It gives a solid 
baseline of what to expect and what other type of information can be found outside infotainments 
systems if it was required.  As predicted, custom solutions or specialized tools are required to 
extract information off manufactured labeled infotainment systems but it is not impossible and 
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Chapter IV – Vehicular Infotainment Forensic Findings 
Throughout the entirety of this research, many types of forensic methods were reviewed 
to get a better grasp of these methodologies and to understand what types of information are 
available to a forensic examiner.  Although there are many methods, many types of devices are 
available to users and different methodologies may be required to obtain information from them; 
this is especially true for the case of infotainment systems which are the main focus of this 
chapter and entire research.  The following chapter will present all methods used to retrieve 
information from different types of infotainment systems as well as the pertinent data itself.  It is 
important to keep in mind that although some of the data is relevant to law enforcement and user 
identification, data extraction through infotainment systems could also be used by researchers 
and any other users trying to better identify the structure of these systems for more than just 
forensic reasons (for e.g., configuration files to identify potential flaws and exploits).   
 
4.1 Research Objective 
As per the hypothesis of this thesis, the main objective is to determine what types of 
information that can be stored on infotainment platforms and the vehicles they are linked to.  The 
implications brought by this research are varying as it opens many avenues considering the 
overall realm of technology; digital forensics has evolved over the years to face many challenges 
and emerging technologies.  The nature of forensics can make a fast changing environment a 
hard variable to deal with considering that documentation and validation techniques must be 
used for proper forensic preservation techniques and analysis of the data.  When new 
technologies are revealed to the world, regardless of their intended functions, it can be used as an 
accessory to a crime and because it is new, it might not be well documented (if not at all) and this 
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makes forensic work for investigators more difficult.  They would then need to research the 
technology in question and understand how it works before any forensic process is undertaken.  
This is particularly true when it comes to infotainment system found in vehicles.  These devices 
are not the most recent technology standalone, but it is its coupling with vehicles that makes it a 
new market in terms of forensic research.  The vehicle manufacturing industry is absolutely 
massive with so many makes and models available and due to the proprietary nature of this 
industry, infotainments systems are custom built themselves and in this case are referred to as 
OEMs. With each individual vehicle model and make, a different operating system could be used 
and the hardware can change itself, not to mention various revisions to base operating system 
and builds of the platforms to ensure that are up to par with current technology and the vehicle 
market.  This demonstrates a clear lack of standardization between various platforms and the 
vehicle it can end up in.  Although Google’s Open Automotive Alliance is pushing for 
standardization across technology firms and vehicle manufacturers, there is still a long way to go 
if a standard was to ever be imposed across infotainment systems.  Android Auto and Apple 
Carplay systems are a stepping stone for this if it ever happens.  Even among aftermarket 
systems, there are so many brands and flavors to choose from, with each having their own base 
operating system and builds, that it is hard to keep track of and not many methodologies are 
available for legitimate forensic processes.  Currently, Berla iVe is the only known tool to 
perform valid forensic acquisitions of OEMs and this will be discussed in a later chapter. 
Regardless if standardization will ever see the day of light across these platforms, it is 
important to state WHY this objective is important and what it means overall, including to law 
enforcement and investigators.  First of all, it is important to know that infotainment system are 
embedded computer systems, and by that nature they inherent all traits of computer systems 
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including storage of digital artifacts.  This means that they can be used to store potential evidence 
just like any regular computer system (the whole basis of digital forensics is based on computer 
systems) which means that any data found on infotainment platforms could potentially be 
evidence. Such evidence can relate to user activity (pre, during and post said activity), ownership 
of the device, multimedia content, communication sessions with other users, device 
configurations and passwords, GPS coordination, etc.  All of this information is valid to 
investigators and their case as it helps them corroborate evidence or even solve a case entirely.  
Just as any other piece of evidence, these systems are barred to the legal constraints of search 
warrants.  If the search warrant is correctly drafted, then all the recovered evidence within the 
search warrant’s scope is relevant and can be presented in the court of law.  This is what 
investigators seek as they want to solve their cases and use all relevant evidence that can help 
prove if someone is guilty or innocent.  This is why it is important to have a general idea of what 
infotainment systems can store so if a vehicle is ever seized and has a system like this, that 
system could hold potential evidence that could swing a case in a complete other direction.  We 
have to acknowledge that these systems are vital to digital forensics and more work and 
methodologies must be developed to ensure forensically sound means for data acquisition and 
the parsing of its data. 
A concrete example demonstrating the practicality of vehicular infotainment forensics 
can go as followed: a 2015 Dodge Challenger gets stolen.  The culprit abandoned the vehicle and 
it is moderately damaged.  The culprit has not been apprehended as the vehicle was recovered 
hours after the victim reported the crime.  The Challenger has a higher-end infotainment system 
residing inside the vehicle (OEM manufactured with the vehicle).  The investigators acquire a 
consent form from the victim allowing the law enforcement agency to perform an acquisition off 
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the device.  Once the acquisition is processed and the data is parsed, the agency finds a GPS 
“breadcrumb trail” in the internal infotainment system’s log files.  They also find out that an 
unknown Bluetooth device was connected to the vehicle at a timestamp shortly after the vehicle 
was reported stolen.  The device’s name is “John’iPhone4S”.  The GPS “breadcrumbs” show a 
few coordinates of local businesses and residences.  Of these businesses, cameras were on scene 
and recorded the vehicle pulling in and the suspect getting out of the vehicle with a clear head 
shot of the individual.  Witnesses are brought in and another suspect is found as the infotainment 
system’s log files demonstrated that a passenger door was opened at a residence linked to a GPS 
coordinate.  After a few days of analyzing the data and following up on leads, the main suspect is 
apprehended and confesses to the crime. 
The example described above showcases exactly why it is important to know what these 
platforms store as it can help directly solve a crime or corroborate evidence to solidify a case.  
The recovered information is all potential evidence and in the eyes of the court of law, any 
evidence is good evidence.  We are hoping to make a point to why infotainment system forensics 
is important and further make case investigators jobs easier.  It is important to note that this work 
is not exclusive to law enforcement as end users of any sort should be aware of what information 
is stored on the vehicles as it can directly or indirectly identify them.  May it be for privacy 
reasons, the general public must be made aware that a lot of information can be potentially found 
in their own vehicles, which seems to be dismissed by many, especially with the interconnection 
of mobile device to infotainment systems.  This would allow for more information to be 
potentially extracted from infotainment systems without even touching the mobile device (for 
e.g. a personal smartphone).  This could further help law enforcement investigators in their 
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respective caseloads when a vehicle is involved and a mobile device was not recovered for the 
same implications mentioned above.  
 
4.2 Targeted Infotainment Systems 
Just like any manufactured computerized platform, vendors vary from one to the other 
creating many different systems; this is especially true with Originally Manufactured Equipment 
(OEM).  OEMs, for infotainment systems, vary the most as a manufacturer would build their 
platform off the base of an OS (for e.g., Windows, QNX and Linux), modify it to their liking 
including custom proprietary applications, builds and tools.  These systems would then be 
rebranded accordingly and have the source code of the OS kept secret due to being proprietary 
(for e.g., Current Ford SYNC platforms up until 2015-2016 are running off Windows 
Automotive but newer models will have a QNX based platform, as shown by Mearian [42]).  
Realistically, it would not be feasible to include all infotainment system due to limited resources 
and time; the objective of the research is to determine what is kept on a select few of these 
systems so that a general understanding can be established as well as concepts for extracting data 
off infotainment platforms which could then be applied to all infotainment systems due to their 
similar functionalities and operations.  OEMs were not the only systems considered; aftermarket 
systems were also tested due to the simple fact that infotainment systems can be third-party 
manufactured and used in vehicles as replacement units or simply adding an infotainment feature 
to vehicle that did not have one (for e.g., basic trim of vehicle without one or older vehicle that 
never had option prior to these systems being released).  The following is a list of the 
infotainment platforms that were tested and the type of acquisition performed on the system: 
 2012 Ford Fiesta SYNC Generation I – Physical Acquisition 
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 2013 Ford Focus SYNC Generation II – Physical Acquisition 
 2013 Ford F-150 SYNC Generation II – Logical Acquisition  
 2013 Dodge Durango uConnect version 8.4 – Logical Acquisition 
 Aftermarket Ouku Windows CE – Logical Acquisition 
 Aftermarket Pumpkin Android Kit-Kat 4.4.4 – Physical Acquisition 
 Aftermarket Pioneer Android-based OS (Android Auto and Apple CarPlay ready) 
– Physical Acquisition  
 Various Volkswagen infotainment platforms – Manual Acquisition 
 Various Audi infotainment platforms – Manual Acquisition 
The data sets recovered from these systems will give a solid baseline of what to expect in terms 
of infotainment content and how it could be associated to end users.  Although the acquisition 
methods vary, these are all valid acquisition techniques which all have their proper place in 
forensics in general as the methods used to extract such information will always vary depending 
on specific circumstances and/or, in the case of law enforcement, legal permissions and warrants. 
 
4.3 Acquisition Methods 
As stated in the previous section, more than one type of acquisition is used but the 
interesting aspect of the acquisitions themselves were the technicalities that were faced in 
acquiring the data.  Although the acquisitions were successful, the means to achieve some of 
them were not traditional methodologies and “outside-the-box” thinking had to be used, 
especially for aftermarket systems.  It is important to note that the acquisitions were not done 
using write-blockers for aftermarket systems as the interfacing between the host machine and the 
infotainment device would not allow a connection.  Although forensically sound to do so, the 
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purpose of this research was to simply obtain the data and identify its use and how it is linked to 
end users.  Also, no live memory acquisitions were attempted as realistically speaking, most 
infotainment systems acquisition methods require the vehicle/infotainment system to be powered 
off at a certain point before any acquisitions of any type can be made due to the intricacies 
discussed below; legal reasons such as the need for search warrants for vehicles could also halt 
this process from the legal perspective.  The following sections will discuss the acquisition 
methods used per-category of system; the acquisition method will be explained first before the 
respective system results’ section if it is the same acquisition methodology used for more than 
one system; there will be an acquisition sub-section per infotainment platform if its method 
varies per individual platform or type and it will be presented before the respective results sub-
section. 
 
4.4 Acquisition Methods and Observed Data  
4.4.1 Audi/Volkswagen Acquisition Method 
These systems’ data were acquired through manual acquisition; specifically this was done 
as there were no tools nor established methods for interacting with the infotainment systems 
developed by Audi and Volkswagen.  The manual acquisition involves simply interacting with 
the systems and using its user interface to see if any data can be recovered or saved to external 
media.  The OWASCO Audi and Volkswagen dealership located in Whiby, Ontario, Canada, 
helped the research effort by giving us access to their four different previously owned and new 
vehicles to tamper with in order to determine if data could be recovered by interacting through 
their respective infotainment system user interfaces.  The four vehicles in question were as 
followed: 
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 2013 Volkswagen Passat – previously owned, no GPS and basic infotainment 
system with limited functionalities  
 2014 Volkswagen Touareg – previously owned, GPS and higher end infotainment 
system with many functionalities 
 2012 Audi Q5 – previously owned, GPS and high end infotainment system with 
many functionalities 
 2014 Audi Q7 – new, GPS and high end infotainment system with many 
functionalities 
To access the information, simply turn the vehicle on and interact with the system itself; all 
available menus and options of the infotainment system were accessed and viewed to determine 
what type of information was available to any user.  Data could be extracted and stored to an 
external SD card if available and inserted in the system slot (this method applied to all the 
systems found in sub-section 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5… please see Various Audi/Volkswagen 
Manual Acquisition Setup appendix for photos of the acquisition process). 
4.4.2 2013 Volkswagen Passat Data (Previously Owned) 
This was the first vehicle that was analyzed through manual acquisition.  It is important 
to note that this specific Volkswagen infotainment was basic in terms of functionalities.  The 
system would only show phone related information of currently connected devices including 
contacts that may have been saved prior to disconnecting the device.  Table 7 enumerates the 
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Table 7. 2013 Volkswagen Passat Extracted Information 
Data Data Type Relevance 
Bluetooth Devices User Data Lists currently and previously 
Bluetooth connected devices 
by user defined name 
Contacts User Data Lists only contacts of 
currently connected device 
 
This does not provide much information apart from any other device that was connected to the 
system in the past.  This could be useful for linking a specific mobile device to a vehicle if the 
device was named something more personal.  The display of contacts of the currently connected 
device could be relevant if the mobile device was still within premise or recovered and kept alive 
to attempt a connection to the system.  Basic infotainment systems do not provide much 
information but it could still be relevant depending on the given circumstances. 
4.4.3 2014 Volkswagen Touareg Data (Previously Owned) 
The second vehicle that was analyzed through manual acquisition did offer a higher-end 
Volkswagen infotainment system with more features and functionalities which showed more 
promise.  The export/import functionalities were enabled on this device which could allow more 
information to be secured.  Table 8 enumerates the data found on this infotainment while 
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Table 8. 2014 Volkswagen Touareg Extracted Information 
Data Data Types Relevance 
Contacts/SIM entries/Call 
Logs 
User Data Lists all contacts and call logs 
that were saved to the system 
(public profile) and current 
mobile device contacts which 
includes contacts saved to the 
mobile device’s potential SIM 
card 
VIN Number System Identifies the exact vehicle 
Number of Programmed keys System Displays amount of keys 
linked to vehicle 




User Data Lists associated mobile device 
profiles as well as mobile 
device names that were 
connected through Bluetooth 
GPS Information Application Data Lists exact GPS coordinates of 
saved locations 
 
Please see the 2014 Volkswagen Touareg appendix for examples of this data.  The information 
accumulated from this type of acquisition shows more relevant information in terms of 
identifying end users.  Leftover contacts, GPS coordinates, call logs, profile information and 
such can better place end users behind the wheel of the vehicle and even at exact coordinates.  
This information can be quite useful depending on the circumstances of the acquisition.  It is 
important to note that any information that is imported to the system is then now part of the 
public profile on the system meaning more information can be exported when this process is 
performed. 
4.4.4 2012 Audi Q5 Data (Previously Owned) 
 The third vehicle that was analyzed through manual acquisition had a high-end Audi 
infotainment system with a good set of features and functionalities.  Exporting and importing 
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was part of this system’s design which allowed more information to be observed.  Table 9 
enumerates the data found on this infotainment while tampering with the UI: 
Table 9. 2012 Audi Q5 Extracted Information 
Data Data Types Relevance 
Contacts/SIM Entries/Call 
Logs 
User Data Lists all contacts and call logs 
that were saved to the system 
(public profile) and current 
mobile device contacts which 
includes contacts saved to the 
mobile device’s potential SIM 
card 
VIN Number System  Identifies the exact vehicle 
Media/Navigation Versions System Displays system media and 
navigation versions 
Bluetooth Devices User Data Lists all mobile device names 
that were connected through 
Bluetooth  
GPS Information Application Data Lists exact GPS coordinates of 
saved locations 
 
Please see the 2012 Audi Q5 appendix for examples of this data.  The acquired information also 
shows relevance to a specific investigation as contacts, call logs, GPS coordinates and a 
Bluetooth device list were observed; identifying potential users of a mobile phone that belong to 
someone is of great interest.  This infotainment system also had the option to password protect 
user data on the system that would prompt a password screen if the public profile was attempted 
to be accessed although the feature was disabled.  Just as the prior system, importing contacts 
opens the opportunity for extracting more information at a later time depending how many 
imports are done on the system. 
4.4.5 2014 Audi Q7 Data (New) 
 The last manual acquisition was performed on a brand new vehicle.  Due to not having 
prior data on the system, the features and functionalities were noted and my personal mobile 
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device was connected to the system (as all prior systems) for a point of reference.  This platform 
was a high-end Audi infotainment system with similar features and functionalities as the 
previous Audi system.  Table 10 enumerates the data found on this infotainment while tampering 
with the UI: 
Table 10. 2014 Audi Q7 Extracted Information 
Data Data Types Relevance 
Contacts/SIM Entries/Call 
Logs 
User Data List all contacts and call logs 
that were saved to the system 
(public profile) and current 
mobile device contacts which 
includes contacts saved to the 
mobile device’s potential SIM 
card 
VIN Number System Identifies the exact vehicle 
Bluetooth Devices User Data Lists all mobile device names 
that were connected through 
Bluetooth 
GPS Coordinates Application Data Lists exact GPS coordinates of 
saved locations of currently 
connected device 
 
Please see the 2014 Audi Q7 appendix for examples of this data.  Similar to the previous Audi 
system, relevant information such as call logs, contacts and a Bluetooth device lists could be 
exported or found on the system though UI browsing.  Memory and GPS information was only 
accessible in relation to the currently connected device so one could not tell the number of 
entries imported/saved from other previously connected devices and favorited locations.  
Importing information would work the same if exported later just as in previous systems due to 
the information being stored publicly.  
4.4.6 OEM Infotainment Systems Acquisition Method 
During the research stage of the project, it was found (and predicted) that OEM systems 
would be the most difficult systems to acquire information due to their proprietary status and 
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interface setups.  But this is not the only issue as hardware placement also hinders the acquisition 
process; normally, to make a system acquisition, one would simply connect the device to a write-
blocker which is connected to a forensic host machine (for e.g., a hard drive or mobile device 
through SATA or USB respectively).  Access to these components is pretty straightforward as 
you simply remove them for their initial location (for e.g., hard drive bay, SD/SIM card trays, 
etc.).  In the case of infotainment system, USB connections do not work as they are only enabled 
for mass-storage mode (debugging is disabled and re-enabling it may not be done unless access 
to source code/reverse-engineer is completed).  Also, finding the correct module inside the 
vehicle is quite the task as wires and vehicle schematics are needed in the first place to locate the 
storage module for the infotainment system.  Once it is located, most of the vehicle’s dashboard 
must be unmounted to retrieve it (see Extra appendix for examples of this process).   
For our case, we acquired an entire Ford SYNC Gen I infotainment platform off 
“Sonshine Auto Parts”, a junkyard dealer located in Ottawa, Ontario (see the Extra appendix for 
acquired Ford SYNC device completely separated from the dashboard).  The entire Ford SYNC 
Gen II infotainment system and Dodge uConnect logical acquisition were given to us through the 
OPP’s TCU.  Once the Ford modules were in-hand, a JTAG physical acquisition process was 
performed on the modules’ board themselves for all of them.  The software and hardware 
solution used to achieve this was Berla iVe version 1.7.1 which can be used to extract such 
information and works with some OEM manufactured devices.  The JTAG acquisition was set to 
only read data (no write operations allowed but can be if configured accordingly).  The process 
depiction is shown in the OEM Infotainment System appendix for a point of reference.  The 
process is as followed (applied to all the systems found in sub-section 4.4.7, 4.4.8, 4.4.9 and 
4.4.10): 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 97 
1. Locate storage module 
2. Open encasement to expose the components board 
3. Connect JTAG pins to proper location on board 
4. Run Berla iVe 
5. Let the software detect the board 
6. Execute acquisition process 
The Dodge uConnect logical acquisition, which was already in our possession thanks to the 
OPP’s assistance, had been done through USB port connection with a host forensic machine 
running Berla iVe and performing its acquisition process… this was the only acquisition process 
that would have been straightforward and not require extended methods.  With this 
software/hardware solution in-hand, the process can be relatively straightforward as the data is 
properly extracted and parsed well by it.  This process requires the user to be careful when 
interacting with the hardware of the infotainment system as it can be fragile to many things 
including breakage and electrostatic discharges.   
Important note: The extracted data was viewed through the use of open source forensic 
tool Autopsy version 4.1.1 (Graphical User Interface version of Sleuthkit) and Notepad++ 
version 6.4.5.  Reports generated by Berla iVe were also viewed as part of the data analysis 
portion. 
4.4.7 2012 Ford Fiesta SYNC Generation I – Physical Acquisition Data 
This module was the first to be physically acquired thanks to the Berla iVe tool.  The 
system itself had offered basic infotainment features and functionalities and did not have a built-
in navigation unit; its main feature was Bluetooth connectivity to mobile devices such as cellular 
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phones for facilitating call management and such.  Table 11 enumerates all types of information 
found on this device’s physical acquisition: 
Table 11. Ford Fiesta SYNC Generation I extracted information 
Data Data Type Location Relevance 
Device Lists User Data /__TFAT_HIDDEN_ROOT_DIR__/ 
MediaCache/ 
File that list devices that were 
connected and their names 
Device Serial 
Number 
User Data /__TFAT_HIDDEN_ROOT_DIR__/ 
MediaCache/ 
Files that list devices’ serial 
numbers of all connected devices 





Files that list devices’ artists and 
songs as well as visited radio 
channels of all connected devices 







Arbitrary files list contact names 
of all devices that were connected 
 
iVe report lists all contacts that 
were downloaded to infotainment 
system 
SMS User Data /__TFAT_HIDDEN_ROOT_DIR__/ 
TxtMsgApp/ 
Potential SMS information (file 
content unsuccessfully recovered)  
Registry System  /__TFAT_HIDDEN_ROOT_DIR__/ 
Documents and Settings/ 
System.hv registry hive file 
located (registry viewers could 
not parse information; some 
potential information viewable in 
Autopsy) 
User Activity  User Data /__TFAT_HIDDEN_ROOT_DIR__/ 
Windows/LogFiles/ 




System Data /__TFAT_HIDDEN_ROOT_DIR__/ 
Windows/DumpFiles/Ce010103-01/ 
Windows memory dump files 
System Events System /__TFAT_HIDDEN_ROOT_DIR__/ 
Windows/ LogFiles/ 
System generated events 












index.dat file located but 
functionality on system was 
disabled (potential internet history 




User Data iVe Report Bluetooth MAC addresses 
System 
Information 
System iVe Report Infotainment system information  
Files System iVe Report All files that were extracted in the 
acquisition  
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Please see the 2012 Ford Fiesta SYNC Generation I – Physical Acquisition appendix for some 
examples of the acquired data.  As we can see, a lot more information was extracted from this 
type of acquisition.  All contact names that were downloaded are shown including playlist 
information on a per-mobile device basis which is of important relevance when trying to identify 
end users.  Serial numbers and Bluetooth MAC addresses can be tied to specific devices that 
were connected to the vehicle which will be then linked to an end user.  System generated events 
can also show potential user activity (for e.g. USB device connecting to the system include 
names of files stored on it for potential clues).  The information discovered on this device would 
help forensic examiners get a better grasp of their respective cases in hopes of identifying 
relevant information simply with the connection of a mobile device to the infotainment system.  
4.4.8 2013 Ford Focus SYNC Generation II – Physical Acquisition Data 
This module’s physical acquisition, compared to the first generation, extracted more 
information due to the fact that this infotainment system had more features including a 
navigation system.  Bluetooth connectivity was also observed and demonstrates relevant data.  
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Table 12. Ford Focus SYNC Generation II extracted information 
Data Data Type Location Relevance 
Bluetooth Data User Data iVe Report Lists all devices that were 




User Data iVe Report List devices’ serial numbers of all 
connected devices 
Call Logs User Data iVe Report Lists call logs of connected devices. 
SMS User Data /img_partition3.img/ Canned SMS data was extracted; 
potential for user generated as 
feature may not have been used 






Emails that were parsed by the 
extraction (probably from contact 
information) 
 
syncp folder had no emails in them 
(feature might of not been used) 
Log Files System /img_partition2.img/$CarvedFiles/ Log files relating to interactions 










System and configuration files, 
certificates and potential security 
keys which could be used to exploit 
the system further if needed 
 
ECU responses to infotainment 
system also found 




All devices’ contact names and 
phone numbers  
Media Playlists User Data /img_partition2.img/Nuance/VCA/ 
 
/img_partition2.img/Gracenote/ 
Media related information of all 
connected devices 
Registry System /img_partition2.img/Documents and 
Settings/ 
System.hv registry hive file located 
(registry viewers could not parse 
information; some potential 
information viewable in Autopsy) 
Odometer 
Readings 
System iVe report Odometer readings 






coordinates/breadcrumbs have been 
extracted and timestamped 
User Activity User Data /img_partition3.img/ 
 
iVe report 
User vehicle interactions are 
recorded such as system time 
change, when vehicle doors are 
opened, when the driver shifts gears 
and USB connections to 
infotainment system 
Files System iVe Report All files that were extracted in the 
acquisition  
 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 101 
Please see the 2013 Ford Focus SYNC Generation II – Physical Acquisition appendix for some 
examples of the acquired data.  As seen in the prior analysis of the first generation SYNC, the 
second one pulls similar expected results and additional information due to the added 
functionalities of the device.  As per usual, contacts, device lists, media playlists, system events 
and such can be retrieved for identification purposes but the exception here is that more 
debugging information is produced and logged by the system such as when doors are opened and 
closed or gears are shifted.  This is particularly useful if a forensic examiner was trying to 
associate an end user to a specific location since GPS breadcrumbs were also collected in the 
extraction.  GPS data is extremely useful and can place the vehicle at exact locations which help 
determine specific circumstances for end users and where they may have been at specific times.  
It is important to note that GPS coordinates are also associated to user interactions to the system 
and vehicle shown in the iVe reports.  Potential SMS and email entries are also useful as 
additional information about a particular investigation may be put to light and/or helps to identify 
end users if available.   
4.4.9 2013 Ford F-150 SYNC Generation II – Logical/File System Acquisition Data 
This extraction is similar to the previous one since both system were of the same 
generation but on a different vehicle.  The content will be more limited in terms of observed 
information as the data acquisition was given to us directly (no image) by the OPP for analysis 
and at the time Berla iVe did not generate reports and had limited support for the extraction 
process.  The fact that only the file system extraction was given makes it similar to a logical 
acquisition and therefore the recovered data set is more limited compared to a physical 
extraction.  Table 13 enumerates all types of information found on this device’s logical 
acquisition: 
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Table 13. Ford F-150 SYNC Generation II extracted information 
Data Data Type Location Relevance 
Email User Data /4D902EB42600_11806208/00000000
01/ 
FileSystem/cache/syncp/ 
Email folder found with 
inbox and outbox (feature 
was not used so it was 
empty) 





Internet history related 
folders found but empty due 
to unused or unavailable 
feature 
Call Logs User Data /4D902EB42600_11806208/00000000
01/ 
FileSystem/Windows/Phonebook/ 
XML file found containing a 
call log on a per-device basis 
Device names User Data /4D902EB42600_11806208/00000000
01/ 
FileSystem/Nuance/VCA/ 
File containing device names 
Bluetooth MAC  User Data /4D902EB42600_11806208/00000000
01/ 
FileSystem/Windows/Phonebook/ 
Folder that lists each 
connected device as per the 











System and configuration 
files, certificates and 
potential security keys which 
could be used to exploit the 
system further if needed 
 
ECU responses to 
infotainment system also 
found 
Log files System /4D902EB42600_11806208/00000000
01/ 
FileSystem/Windows/LogFiles/ 
Log files tracking user 
interactions with 
infotainment system and 
vehicle as well as odometer 





















Odometer readings were 
discovered 
Media Playlists System /4D902EB42600_11806208/00000000
01/ 
FileSystem/Windows/LogFiles/ 
Visited radio stations are 
listed 
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Please see the 2013 Ford F-150 SYNC Generation II – Logical Acquisition appendix for some 
examples of the acquired data.  As observed, some minor variations compared to the content 
acquired from the Ford Focus as there is less due to the format the data dump was given.  The 
device was also not heavily utilized and relatively new when it was recovered and initial 
acquisition was done.  The important things to notice is that regardless of the format (had to use 
traditional file explorer method to traverse logical acquisition), relevant information was still 
found such as phone book and email folders, potential Internet history, media playlists, GPS 
coordinates and so on as shown above.  This data set is quite relevant as it shows data can still be 
extracted and analyzed even if less effective means were used to traverse the given file system 
and its respectful data; forensic analysts are sometime require to work with whichever means 
they are provided to identify whatever relevant information they are seeking. 
4.4.10 2013 Dodge Durango uConnect version 8.4 – Logical Acquisition 
The logical acquisition of this device permitted me to access a good data set with 
valuable information within the device.  This infotainment system was higher-end in term of 
features and functionalities including WiFi capabilities for devices within the vehicle as well as 
typical Bluetooth functionality.  Table 14 enumerates all types of information found on this 
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Table 14. Dodge Durango SYNC uConnect version 8.4 extracted information 
Data Data Type Location Relevance 
Screenshots System Extracted with acquisition and stored 
within a variable named folder in 
acquisition folder 
Any screenshot taken on 
the system is saved 
Contacts/Call 
logs 







Lists all contacts and call 
logs of all devices stored in 
many arbitrary named files  




All SMS data sent through 
infotainment system can be 
observed in clear text 




Files list device brand, 
model, version and 
Bluetooth MAC address of 
all connected devices 
Emails User Data Extracted by iVe Lists all emails that were 
downloaded by 
infotainment system 






List of installed 
applications on the system 
User Activity Application 
Data 
/ExtractedPartitions/fs/etfs/usr/var/qdb/ “pim” file reports on user 
related activities (Dropbox 
was used to upload 
pictures) 
System Events System /ExtractedPartitions/fs/etfs/usr/var/qdb/ System generated events 
under “key_value” which 







“mme” file displays some 
system information such as 
default WiFi password 






System iVe report Timestamped odometer 
readings are displayed 
Files System iVe Report All files that were extracted 
in the acquisition  
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Please see the 2013 Dodge Durango uConnect version 8.4 – Logical Acquisition appendix for 
some examples of the acquired data.  As observed through the data analysis, many types of 
information can be recovered from even a logical acquisition.  The infotainment system provided 
information such as SMS data, all contacts and connected devices, system information, emails 
linked to the devices and so on.  This information is again extremely valuable to forensic 
examiners as it will lead to the identification of the system end users. 
4.4.11 Aftermarket Infotainment Systems Acquisition Method 
The acquisition process for aftermarket systems required a bit more research and use of 
third-party tools to properly establish a connection between devices.  Just like OEMs, USB 
connections are only enabled for mass-storage mode/multimedia content and USB debugging is 
also disabled.  Now, because these systems are aftermarket, there are methods that were 
tested/discovered for enabling debug mode on either USB or other interfaces.  This enabled 
means of data extractions on systems that initially had such features disabled.  Each system 
below will have a separate acquisition sub-section explaining the process as each platform 
differed when acquiring its data.   
Important note: The extracted data was viewed through the use of open source forensic 
tool Autopsy version 4.1.1 (Graphical User Interface version of Sleuthkit) and Notepad++ 
version 6.4.5.   
4.4.12 Ouku Windows CE – Logical Acquisition 
4.4.12.1 Acquisition Method 
As mentioned just above, USB debugging for this device was disabled.  The user 
interface (UI) on the device offered limited functionalities and configuration settings.  The most 
important thing that was taken note was the fact that this was a custom UI running on top of a 
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Windows system.  After further testing, it was noted that the GPS functionality enabled on the 
system could be activated through path execution; in other words the GPS button on the system 
would traverse a predefined path and execute whichever EXE located there, which initially was a 
GPS application.  Here are the steps in order executed to hijack this call and initialize acquisition 
process: 
1. Remove GPS micro-SD card from system tray 
2. Load Windows CE tools in micro-SD card 
3. Place back into system tray 
4. Change path to GPS executable to point to folder with Windows CE tools 
5. Press GPS button on system 
6. Windows CE executable hijacks UI call and runs “explorer.exe” 
7. Windows Explorer is loaded and file system is fully accessible 
8. Execute “MortScript.exe” which copies file system to micro-SD card 
Please refer to the Ouku Windows CE 6 Infotainment System appendix.  It is also important to 
note that the Control Panel could be accessed through Windows Explorer and USB debugging 
could be enabled through a system call (initially disabled).  This would allow a host forensic 
machine to browse the device through Windows Mobile Device Center as an alternative. 
4.4.12.2 Observed Data 
This system had to be heavily tampered with to get passed its limited built-in UI.  With 
the use of third-party tools, a file system (logical) dump was achieved by copying all the contents 
to an external micro-SD card connected to the system’s GPS slot to bypass mass-storage mode.  
The functionalities of the device include typical Bluetooth connections and a GPS application for 
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a built-in navigation software package.  Table 15 enumerates all types of information found on 
this device’s logical acquisition: 
Table 15. Ouku Windows CE extracted information 





/iGO/save/profiles/01/ Favorited locations of 
any users are saved in 
the user.upoi file 
Contacts User Data /Residentialflash3/BT/ Files store contact 
phone numbers and 
names 
Call Logs User Data /Residentialflash3/BT/ Files store all call logs 
SMS User Data /Residentialflash3/BT/ Potential SMS data is 
stored on the system 
at this location but 
may not be extracted 
(resources in current 
use by system) 
 
As initially predicted, not only to the limits of a logical acquisition but to the limitations of the 
tools, not as much data was extracted from aftermarket systems although some relevant 
information was still acquired.  Although the files were malformed and in unspecified formats, 
phone contacts and names and call logs were still retrieved.  Potential SMS information was 
viewable in the same location as the contacts and call logs but could not be extracted due to the 
OS being unable to liberate these files.  GPS information was discovered as well which can be 
valuable to a forensic examiner as it could link end users to specific locations.  Another 
important note to take is that more information was viewable during live acquisition including 
the registry but the files would not be allowed to be copied out of the system (OS would restrict 
this action).  As much as the registry is useful for data analysis, live memory acquisitions of 
infotainment systems are highly unlikely due to the car being powered off by the time it is in 
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possession and tampering with live evidence is a bad practice for forensic examiners.  Please see 
the Ouku Windows CE – Logical Acquisition appendix for some examples of the acquired data. 
4.4.13 Pumpkin Android Kit-Kat 4.4.4 – Physical Acquisition 
4.4.13.1 Acquisition Method 
Similar to the Windows CE system, this Android system also had USB debugging 
disabled as mass-storage mode is the default mode for USB connections.  Normally, ADB can be 
enabled by accessing developer mode through the systems menu on the device.  The device did 
not have developer options enabled and was not accessible.  This causes an issue as ADB could 
not be turned on for USB ports.  Through the use of the “XDA-Developers” forum, it was 
discovered that root access could be gained through factory settings of the infotainment system.  
This menu enabled special commands for execution if the right command was entered.  The 
following is the exact process used to enable debugging mode which would allow extraction of 
data off the Android powered infotainment system: 
1. Access Factory Settings menu in Setting menu 
2. Enter the following command to enable root access: *#hct#root# 
3. Connect infotainment system to WiFi 
4. Download terminal emulator on device 
5. Access super user privileges in emulator 
6. Enable ADB-over-WiFi service in command line  
7. Download Android SDK  
8. Shell into platform from forensic machine 
9. Execute “dd” command on MTD blocks located in /dev directory and save data to 
micro-SD card to external media 
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Please see Pumpkin Android Kit-Kat 4.4.4 Infotainment System appendix for specific commands 
and end result of steps mentioned above.  Even with debugging mode enabled, forensic tools 
could not be connected to the device as it was interfacing with the host device through a WiFi 
connection which could only be used to deliver commands directly to the infotainment system’s 
command line.  This is still quite notable as an alternate method was discovered for accessing 
root directories of the device which gives access to the entire system as well as running the “dd” 
utility for data extraction.  
4.4.13.2 Observed Data 
The following system also produced many issues when it came to the acquisition.  After 
finally enabling the ADB feature, the acquisition itself was successful.  The system also had 
many features including WiFI connectivity, Bluetooth and a navigation application.  Although 
the acquisition was successful and all MTD blocks were successfully imaged to the host 
machine, parsing the images was not successful (more than one acquisition attempt was made in 
trying to parse the information but it was unsuccessful).  Only the user image (MTD block 11) 
was successfully parsed but limited information was available as most files could not be read due 
to their formats (or lack of one) as well as the inability of parsing the certain MTD blocks. Table 
16 lists the information found on this device’s physical acquisition: 
Table 16. Pumpkin Android extracted information 
Data Data Type Location Relevance 
Google Account User Data /img_kitkatIMG12.img/Android/data 
com.android.google.apps.maps/cache/ 
This associates a 
google account to the 
infotainment system 
which are needed for 
some functionalities 
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Although this is very limited information, the fact that the Google account was found in clear 
text can be of great relevance when it comes to identifying an end user (a test account was made 
and logged on to the infotainment system before the acquisition).  The rest of the available 
information is non-existent (a “(2)” depicted by a folder’s name in Autopsy means no other files 
are available as the only folders left in the directory are [parent folder] and [current folder] which 
are only redirects).  Please see the Pumpkin Android Kit-Kat 4.4.4 – Physical Acquisition 
appendix for some examples of the acquired data.  The Google account is normally only 
associated to one end user and this can be enough information to place an end user inside the 
vehicle.  This analysis is still important as it shows that some systems are still not forensically 
accessible and that standardized methods need to be developed.  Another thing to consider would 
be that maybe this infotainment system only keeps information about contacts, call logs, SMS 
and so on live memory and that this data is not stored in any manner; this is possible as the 
infotainment system could simply re-download the contacts and related mobile device 
information when a it connects to the system as the infotainment platform this data to properly 
function. 
4.4.14 Pioneer Android-based OS – Physical Acquisition 
4.4.14.1 Acquisition Method 
This system was also limited to a disabled USB debugging mode as mentioned in this 
chapter’s previous section.  Workarounds had to be researched and tested for either enabling 
ADB or finding an alternative to extracting the information out of this system.  It was discovered 
that during the boot process of the device, any inserted USB stick could trigger the system to 
boot in a “testmode”.  This mode enabled debugging by default and the ability to run system 
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scripts but specific file was needed on the USB device.  The process used to enable “testmode” 
and start the acquisition process is as followed: 
1. Format USB memory stick in FAT32 for device computability   
2. Create the following file “textmode_a.key” with specifically crafted key and load 
it into USB device 
3. Create “dd” script for MTD system on infotainment device 
4. Connect USB device to infotainment system 
5. Power on the system 
6. Infotainment system reboots in “testmode” 
7. “dd” script is executed and data is extracted from the /dev directory and saved to 
the USB device 
Please see the Pioneer Android-Variant Infotainment System appendix for point of reference of 
method described above.  This method proved to be effective and less time consuming.  The 
drawback is that this method is on a “per system” basis meaning it would not work on all 
Android systems as well as the extraction can only be done through accessing a testing mode 
which enables scripts to be executed.  If WiFi connectivity was enabled on this device, ADB-
over-WiFi could potentially be enabled but this was not the case. 
4.4.14.2 Observed Data 
The following system was the newest one in contrast to all previously analyzed 
infotainment systems.  It did not have WiFi capabilities nor an embedded navigation utility but 
did allow for the direct interfacing of Android and Apple devices; these features are called 
Android Auto and Apple CarPlay respectively.  These functionalities allow the infotainment 
systems to make use of the mobile devices’ built-in features such as Internet access and GPS 
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capabilities.  Once the system entered test mode and MTD blocks were acquired, Autopsy was 
successful in parsing the images.  Table 17 enumerates all types of information found on this 
device’s physical acquisition: 
Table 17. Pioneer Android-variant extracted information 
Data Data Type Location Relevance 
Media 
Playlists 
User Data /img_AVIC_AndroidAuto_FinalImage.img/ 
Vol_vol24/$Unalloc/ 
Visited radio stations 
and connected device 
media can be located 
Deleted 
Media 
User Data /img_AVIC_AndroidAuto_FinalImage.img/ 
Vol_vol24/$CarvedFiles/  
Deleted media such 
as images can be 
located 
Emails User Data Autopsy extraction  Any email within 
files can be viewed 
 
Although this is not as much information as originally predicted, there is still information 
of relevance in associating end users to the infotainment devices such as recovering pictures, 
viewing media playlists acquired from connected devices and potential emails that may be 
relayed to the system through other files.  Please see the Pioneer Android-based OS – Physical 
Acquisition appendix for some examples of the acquired data.  Based off the Pumpkin analysis 
and comparing it to this one, it seems like aftermarket systems (and newer Oss) do not seem to 
store as much user information.  This of course is a possibility as infotainment systems, just by 
their observed behavior, only seem to relay information between connected devices and 
themselves.  This is of course the practical approach when designing such systems as user data 
sourced from connected devices is stored there originally.  This could explain the lack of data for 
aftermarket systems; this does not go without saying that more standardized acquisition methods 
should be developed for attempting to acquire more data but it could be a built-in functionality to 
not store certain personal identifiable information on the infotainment devices.  Regardless, the 
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information discovered can still be of relevance as forensic examiners tend to use what they have 
to achieve their end goals; any relative information is good information. 
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Chapter V – Results Implications and Contributions 
As stated in the previous chapter, a lot of information can be found in infotainment 
system (although this can depend on the amount of interactions made by the users, if other 
systems are linked to the infotainment systems and if the users allow for their devices to 
synchronize with the infotainment system).  It is important that these results are discussed as 
there is potential to the direct involvement in an investigator’s case work.  Just like any computer 
system, not all extracted information is relevant to the investigator’s case and the degree of 
usefulness can vary depending on the type of investigation.  The important notion to grasp is that 
the implications can be huge and life changing, especially if admitted in the court of law as 
evidence.  This chapter will discuss these results further and what they can mean.  It is important 
to note that I have acquired personal experience working as a digital forensic analyst and 
investigator and these deductions can be made from personal handling of evidence as well as the 
interpretation of the data and how it can be used as I worked actual cases (not specific to vehicle 
infotainment systems, but in regards to digital artifacts as a whole).   
 
5.1 Results Summary 
The previous chapter has shown many infotainment system data sets being acquired from 
different platforms from OEM and aftermarket systems alike.  This is important as it shows that 
an acquisition is possible across different vendors regardless of the underlying OS.  It also shows 
variance across the quantity of data acquired as not every acquisition type was the same (manual 
versus logical/file system versus physical acquisition alike).  Infotainment system builds will 
also cause acquired data sets to vary (OEM versus. aftermarket), not to mention access to the 
data itself as aftermarket system required creative solutions versus supported forensic acquisition 
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tools provided for OEM systems.  Table 18 below displays and summarize the overall types of 
data artifacts that were able to be recovered across all the different infotainment system 
platforms mentioned in the previous chapter ("?" means that there is potential for this 
information to be recovered and parsed but complications such malformed/unreadable files, 
features not being used/implemented or file access restrictions were observed):   
Table 18. Summary Results Table 
 Passat Touareg Q5 Q7 Fiesta Focus 
F-
150 
Durango OUKU Pumpkin Pioneer 
Profile/Device 
Name 
        - - - 
Contacts       -   - - 
SIM Entries -    - - - - - - - 
Call Logs -         - - 
VIN -    - - - - - - - 
# Keys -  - - - - - - - - - 
GPS Data -    -   -  - - 
Software 
Version 
-   - - - - - - - - 
Device Serial 
# 
- - - -   - - - - - 
Device 
Playlist 
- - - -    - - -  
SMS - - - - ? ? -  ? - - 
Registry - - - - ? ? - - - - - 
User Activity - - - -     - - - 
Windows 
Dump 
- - - -  - - - - - - 
Internet 
History 
- - - - ? - ? - - - - 
Bluetooth 
MAC 
- - - -     - - - 
System 
Information 
- - - -     - - - 
Files List - - - -   -  - - - 
Email - - - - - ? ?  - -  
Log Files - - - - -   - - - - 
Configuration 
Files 
- - - - -    - - - 
Odometer - - - - -    - - - 
Screenshots - - - - - - -  - - - 
Installed 
Applications 
- - - - - - -  - - - 
User Account - - - - - - - - -  - 
Deleted 
Media 
- - - - - - - - - -  
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5.2 Various Audi/Volkswagen Infotainment Systems  
For this section, we will discuss the meaning of the data types/artifacts discovered on 
various Audi and Volkswagen infotainment platforms.  These artifacts were collected through a 
manual acquisition methodology meaning it was all done within the infotainment system’s user 
interface and “hidden in plain sight” doctrine.  Please refer to sub-section 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 
4.4.5 to view the specifics of each system data extractions (respectively 2013 Volkswagen Passat, 
2014 Volkswagen Touareg, 2012 Audi Q5 and 2014 Audi Q7).  The following list will showcase 
the artifacts collected as a whole across all devices and what they mean on an individual basis for 
this specific type of acquisition: 
 Bluetooth Devices (name) – This lists the currently and previously connected mobile 
devices via Bluetooth.  This only displays the name of the device but this holds relevance 
as it helps corroborate evidence (for e.g. suspect or victim’s name as the name of the 
device) by linking said device to a potential owner 
 Contacts – Contact information can display potential persons of interest in relation to the 
device in question (which can include various telephone numbers, email addresses, 
company name, etc.) and help disprove any claims that the owner of the device does not 
know a certain individual if said person is in the contacts’ list 
 SIM Entries – Relates to contact information; these entries are specifically saved to a 
SIM card meaning they are important to the owner 
 Call Logs – This information shows call records between the device owner and another 
party; this especially important as it shows that the two parties were in contact at one 
point and shows user activity (including timestamps) 
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 VIN – This information links an infotainment system to a specific vehicle which is useful 
to either confirm the vehicle’s VIN or if the infotainment system was sold as a standalone 
unit (taken out of original vehicle) and the need for the identification of the original 
vehicle is needed 
 Programmed Keys – Shows if there is more than one key associated to the device (for 
e.g. investigator looking to find if a vehicle was stolen with a second set of keys versus 
suspect saying the owner had his keys so it could not be him) 
 Media/Navigation Versions – Helps determine specifics of an infotainment system and 
if it can be compatible with forensic tools 
 General Profiles – This information displays all data saved to the infotainment system 
from other previously connected devices including call logs, contacts, GPS information, 
etc.  This can help link users to the vehicle and further corroborate the identity of the 
vehicle’s owner 
 GPS Information – This information showcases “favorited” GPS information and exact 
coordinates including the “home”, “work” and custom saved locations.  This is especially 
useful in identifying the owner of the vehicle and places that he/she may regularly attend.  
This also places a person of interest at specific locations if said individual ever denies 
being there 
 
5.3 OEM Infotainment Systems 
This section will discuss the various artifacts that were extracted on various Ford OEM 
infotainment systems (logical/file system and physical extraction types) as well as a logical 
acquisition off a Dodge OEM system.  Logical/file system acquisition extract everything that is 
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visible within the file system and its traversable tree structure; physical acquisitions will do a bit-
by-bit copy of the entire storage space which will included everything found in unallocated 
space.   Please refer to sub-section 4.4.7, 4.4.8, 4.4.9 and 4.4.10 to view the specifics of each 
system data extractions (respectively 2012 Ford Fiesta SYNC Generation I, 2013 Ford Focus 
SYNC Generation II, 2013 Ford F-150 SYNC Generation II and 2013 Dodge Durango uConnect 
version 8.4).  The following list will showcase the artifacts collected as a whole across all 
devices and what they mean on an individual basis for this specific type of acquisition: 
 Bluetooth Devices (name and address) - This lists the currently and previously 
connected mobile devices via Bluetooth.  The name of the device as well as the Bluetooth 
MAC address are displayed which holds relevance as it helps corroborate evidence by 
linking said device to a potential owner (for e.g. suspect or victim’s name as the name of 
the device or linking a seized mobile device to the infotainment platform to place its 
owner to the vehicle) 
 Device Serial Number – Similar to the Bluetooth MAC address, this information helps 
identify a specific mobile device and if it was connected to the infotainment system at 
any point.  This can help place a device’s owner behind the wheel of a vehicle or in the 
very least, as a user of the infotainment system 
 Device Playlist - This information can help corroborate data extracted from the 
infotainment system to potentially known information about a user and help identify them 
(for e.g. device playlist name has first and/or last name of a user or respective children) 
 Contacts - Contact information can display potential persons of interest in relation to the 
device in question (which can include various telephone numbers, email addresses, 
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company name, etc.) and help disprove any claims that the owner of the device does not 
know a certain individual if said person is in the contacts’ list 
 SMS data - This information can greatly help identify communication sessions between 
two or many parties and the content of the discussion which can be relevant to an 
investigation.   It also proves whether contact with persons of interest was made and 
show whether specific plans or events happened (or their respective planning) as well as 
the timestamps for the communication instances 
 Registry – The information found in registry files can be of great relevance as it may 
contain device specific configuration information relevant to the infotainment system, 
associated users and their accounts, installed applications, user activity, and much more.  
All this information can corroborate a lot of potential evidence, suspicions and user 
activity.  This depends on the specific hive files extracted and if the file can be parsed 
correctly (which depends on the infotainment system model and base operating system).  
Important note: the HV file found could not be parsed by the tools at hand and may need 
a custom solution to view all of its contents 
 User Activity – The information found in specific log files correlates to user activity and 
what applications that have been used on the infotainment system (or relayed to it). This 
can also include timestamps.  The information gathered can be useful as it can place a 
user accessing specific resources on the infotainment system or used it to perform an 
action through a mobile device (for e.g. user downloads a specific application through the 
device’s application store and then logs on his/her account through it) 
 Windows Dump – Although specific to Windows based infotainment systems, the dump 
file can contain activity held in the memory/RAM of the device which can show a wealth 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 120 
of information (for e.g. user credentials, user activity, communication instances, call logs, 
etc.).  Important note: The dump file could not be parsed with the forensic tools at hand 
 System data – This relates to information generated by the infotainment system itself 
automatically, including “powering on and off” events, communication with internal 
buses or even ECUs within the vehicle, USB/external media connecting to the 
infotainment system, related timestamps, etc.  This is relevant as it showcases when the 
device was specifically in use or if specific devise were connected to the platform at 
certain times which can further help corroborate evidence and/or claims 
 Internet History – As per its name, this category of data will list the browsing history of 
users based on their use of Internet browsing clients, not limited to sites visited, 
timestamps of visits, search terms, downloaded items and so on.  This shows relevance to 
an investigator as it is fully part of the user activity category overall.  Important note: the 
infotainment system this was pulled from did not have a browser so the corresponding 
directory within the file system did not have any files but shows that the potential is there 
for infotainment systems with this functionality enabled 
 Files List – This displays a full list of all files extracted from the infotainment system 
which can help investigators quickly identify files of potential interest (and check if they 
are present).  This is more to facilitate the analysis as the files themselves would be of 
actual evidence worth.  Important note: this was for extractions done with the Berla iVe 
tool 
 Emails - Information found in emails can clarify communication instances between two 
parties as well as identifying email users, the content of the discussion and timestamps of 
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communications.  Emails are as relevant as SMS data due to the shared similarities in 
their nature and can display a wealth of information 
 Log Files – These files hold particular value as they show direct interactions of the 
vehicle users with the system and vehicle including when doors are opened and closed, 
gears are shifted, connections of USB/mobile devices to the system and when the system 
is powered on and off.  These specific events all generate GPS coordinates at the time of 
the happening further helping investigators pinpoint details about the users of the vehicles 
including their locations, connected devices and potential embarking and disembarking of 
passengers 
  Application/Service Configuration Files – These files show information relating to 
specific configuration of applications and services running on the infotainment system.  
Although this data does not associate the end users, it can help investigators determine if 
specific tools are compatible with the device or specific applications and potential 
exploits that may allow for workarounds if required (for e.g. OpenSSL being used by the 
Ford SYNC infotainment could have a Heartbleed vulnerable version if unpatched) 
 Odometer Readings – This information can help determine investigators in assessing 
and further corroborating the overall journey of the vehicle and if it was left idling or was 
actually moving if GPS coordinates are strange or remain in same vicinity 
 GPS Information - This information showcases “favorited” GPS information and exact 
coordinates including the “home”, “work” and custom saved locations.  Vehicle and 
system generated events also generated GPS coordinates which can further be used to 
prove the vehicle user’s exact location at specific times (for e.g. when the vehicle shifts 
gear and vehicle doors are opened/closed, GPS coordinates are generated).  This is 
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especially useful in identifying the owner of the vehicle and places that he/she may 
regularly attend.  This also places a person of interest at specific locations if said 
individual ever denies being there 
 Screenshots – These multimedia-related artifacts can vary in degree of usefulness 
depending on the exact content that is captured.  It can range from a being a trivial picture 
of a background to a picture of a potential user/owner of the infotainment system/mobile 
device or picture relating directly to the crime being investigated.  Regardless, there is 
relevance to these if recovered on the infotainment system 
 Call Logs - This information shows call records between the device owner and another 
party; this especially important as it shows that the two parties were in contact at one 
point and shows user activity (including timestamps) 
 Installed Applications – Just like files list, this information can be useful in identifying 
all installed applications on the infotainment system which can give an investigator an 
idea of what to expect and look for when analyzing the extracted information.  This is 
more to facilitate the analysis as the applications and related user data would be of actual 
evidence worth although it can help corroborate evidence if a person of interest was to 
deny of ever using an application and this information proved otherwise 
 VIN - This information links an infotainment system to a specific vehicle which is useful 
to either confirm the vehicle’s VIN or if the infotainment system was sold as a standalone 
unit (taken out of original vehicle) and the need for the identification of the original 
vehicle is needed 
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5.4 Aftermarket Infotainment Systems 
This section of the chapter will showcase the artifacts and data types that were extracted 
on various aftermarket infotainment systems (logical and physical extraction types).  Logical 
acquisition extract everything that is visible within the file system and its traversable tree 
structure; physical acquisitions will do a bit-by-bit copy of the entire storage space which will 
included everything found in unallocated space.   Please refer to sub-section 4.4.12.2, 4.4.13.2 
and 4.4.14.2 to view the specifics of each system data extractions (respectively OUKU Windows 
CE platform, Pumpkin Android Kit-Kat version 4.4.4 platform and Pioneer Android based 
version).  The following list will showcase the artifacts collected as a whole across all devices 
and what they mean on an individual basis for this specific type of acquisition: 
 GPS Information - This information showcases “favorited” GPS information and exact 
coordinates including the “home”, “work” and custom saved locations (depending on the 
device model, potential for more GPS information is also there).  This is especially useful 
in identifying the owner of the vehicle and places that he/she may regularly attend.  This 
also places a person of interest at specific locations if said individual ever denies being 
there 
 Contacts – Depending on the infotainment system, this information displays all contacts 
from all associated mobile devices (current and prior) which shows potential persons of 
interest (including their names, multiple telephone numbers, email address, company 
name, etc.) as well as corroborate whether the owner knows someone or not 
 Call Logs - This information shows call records between the device owner and another 
party; this especially important as it shows that the two parties were in contact at one 
point and shows user activity (including timestamps) 
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 SMS data – This information can greatly help identify communication sessions between 
two or many parties and the content of the discussion which can be relevant to an 
investigation.   It also proves whether contact with persons of interest was made and 
show whether specific plans or events happened (or their respective planning) as well as 
the timestamps for the communication instances.  Important note: potential for SMS data 
was found but the file contents were not accessible due to it being tied to a running 
process (and could not be extracted for the same reason).  The file was found in the same 
location where call logs and contacts were stored and the file name was suggestive to 
SMS related information 
 User Account – This information identifies the infotainment system’s users based on 
accounts tied to applications used by the platform.  Although account names don’t 
necessarily identify a user or the owner of the device, it can still be useful in 
corroborating evidence, especially if a specific account is already being sought in a 
search warrant.  If it is found on the infotainment system, then it helps link the identity of 
the user and/or which account is being specifically used for specific applications on the 
infotainment system (this also helps determine user activity specifically) 
 Media Playlist – This information can help corroborate data extracted from the 
infotainment system to potentially known information about a user and help identify them 
(for e.g. device playlist name has first and/or last name of a user or respective children) 
 Emails – Information found in emails can clarify communication instances between two 
parties as well as identifying email users, the content of the discussion and timestamps of 
communications.  Emails are as relevant as SMS data due to the shared similarities in 
their nature and can display a wealth of information 
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 Multimedia Content – The information shown by this data type can be of great 
importance as it may help identify the owner, victims, potential suspects, etc.  The 
multimedia content can also corroborate other evidence (for e.g. in a drug case, pictures 
of illicit substances or in the case of child pornography, illicit multimedia content).  
Timestamps of pictures and EXIF data can also be used by an investigator to further push 
an investigation 
 
5.5 Forensic Contributions 
The body of knowledge in (digital) forensics as a whole is absolutely massive 
considering how much technology has evolved over the past decades.  So many types of 
computerized platforms have been developed to facilitate our lives for a multitude of reasons.  
With this, the ability to store and safe keep information has had many perks, including in the 
context of law enforcement, but the added complexities from the constant evolution and changes 
brought forth by technology has added challenges in the field of digital forensics.  Malicious use 
of technology and/or malicious intent of accessing data has led to the development of digital 
forensic suite and tools to tackle such activities.  The vast amount and types of computer devices 
make the process much more complicated so it is important to (try to) stay on top of technology 
trends to fully understand them and the potential usability of their data, may it be for combatting 
crime or general understanding/awareness. 
The research and content of this thesis has covered and discussed many forensic topics so 
that a broader understanding of it could be attained and its general theory applied to further 
advance the field.  First of all, the existing documentation on vehicular forensic is very limited so 
it is clear that the field is new as a whole.  Infotainment systems are becoming increasingly 
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popular and utilized considering technology and its overall daily use.  As shown so far, having 
such systems harbor that much potential information should be of great interest to anyone in the 
field of digital forensics.  This thesis’ overall content contributes in terms of education and 
training as it discusses all the types of data found on these systems and what that data could 
potentially mean if collected and analyzed.  There is already a clear lack of tools to access such 
data which does not help in spreading awareness of its existence.  Law enforcement agencies and 
the general public must be educated on the potential use or dangers of data residing on these 
specific computerized platforms.  This can give guidelines to know what to look for when 
attempting to extract information and how the data could be relevant to an investigation (for e.g. 
depending on the type of investigation, a case investigator could determine if seizing the vehicle 
could advance and help the investigation). In terms for the general public, this can educate them 
in the risks of connecting personal mobile devices to the systems and what information could end 
up on it; this would help them make an informed decision when connecting their mobile devices 
to the system (for e.g. should we allow the system to sync all of the data to the infotainment 
platform or limit it/deny it the access).  This research’s theory can also be applied to train 
investigators on where to look for specific information at specific storage location if data has 
already been acquired.  It helps them better understand what they can do with it and if they can 
correlate it to other pieces of evidence.  This is why it is important to know what these systems 
can store as a whole; the importance of establishing a baseline and proof-of-concept that data can 
be found and utilized is important knowledge that must be made aware of and added to the entire 
field. 
In terms of acquisition of the data itself, the proposed and discussed methodologies can 
be used as a baseline.  It is important to note that these methodologies will not work for every 
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infotainment system deployed in the public as too many factors come into play (vast variations 
of operating systems, hardware designs and specifications and software versions/builds).  These 
extraction methodologies are documented and discussed to show that there are solutions and 
possibilities when tackling undocumented infotainment platforms.  The general concept and 
theory can be applied to attempt to approach new systems and extracting information from them.  
Although some may require custom built solution (i.e. Berla iVe), it is not impossible to come up 
with one by approaching these systems from the ground up (for e.g. start by studying the 
underlying components of these systems to better understand them so you can apply a practical 
approach in acquiring data).  Infotainment system, in general, are built like regular computer 
systems (just designed more in an embedded form) which means you could apply already known 
concepts to communicate with these systems.  These methodologies demonstrate a general 
though process to undertake and case investigators could use this added knowledge to better 
handle these devices with limited documentation.  This is also important for general awareness as 
it may direct users to better understand these platforms so potential data safekeeping measures 
can be taken (for e.g. disabling potential services, if capable, so that data could be less accessible 
externally).   
Finally, an important final contribution for this work is validation.  Validation of data is 
what one analyst would use to ensure data accuracy even if it varies across different/similar 
devices; it is very important to prove that discovered data indeed exists on the targeted device for 
proof of user activities regardless of how much data was collected from the extraction (quality 
versus quantity – if both can be achieved, even better).  One can theorize about data being held 
and stored on infotainment systems (which this thesis also accomplishes) but to showcase that 
the data is there is of upmost importance as the data itself has global applications once parsed 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 128 
and interpreted (not limited to law enforcement investigations).  Access to these systems with 
appropriate tools and techniques is not easily attainable as well as it requires to dismantle the 
vehicle’s interior and removing an entire system for its study (the general population owns 
vehicles to drive them and make use of their systems, not dismantle them).  This research 
allowed for dedicated means of studying these systems and discussing the acquired results and 
proving they exist and are attainable.  Variation is also important for the sake of data consistency 
or its comparison if it changes depending on the different infotainment systems.  As new models 
are produced and deployed to the public, data set extractions could vary (for the better or worse) 
and it is important to make these observations so that data interpretations still hold relevance (for 
e.g. a new generation of an infotainment system is released and as a result, the acquisition 
methodology for its previous builds no longer works or only extracts a small subset of data). In 
this case, the data still needs to be checked and verified as it could be a question of the tool not 
parsing the information but still collecting it (data carving methodologies required but could 
potentially recover more data).  Any slight alternation to the build of a computerized platform 
can affect a digital forensic process entirely and potentially break it so validation is an important 
foundation step for forensics as a whole, especially in newer digital forensic fields.  Until 
standardization is implemented in infotainment system platforms (to a baseline degree in the 
least), there will be variance in the data that is extracted, especially across different infotainment 
platforms.  In theory, the demonstrated acquisition methodologies, results and their 
interpretations validate the sought information as originally predicted (to various degrees 
depending on the specific infotainment system in our case). 
The data interpretation, data acquisition process and overall theory can be viewed as a 
framework to follow when identifying these devices and attempting to extract and interpret the 
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data off of them.  The overall theory of this research contributes to the body of knowledge of 
forensics from an educational/training aspect and forms a framework to apply when interacting 
with infotainment systems; these systems are built, at their basis, as general computer systems 
which helps determine potential approaches for acquiring and analyzing the stored data.  This 
thesis also validates the sought data which is essential for proof-of-concepts.  This further 
advances vehicular infotainment forensics as it demonstrates that the overall potential of digital 
forensics can benefit from the added methodologies and general thought process to use when 
interacting with new types of devices.  
 
5.6 Final Thoughts 
As a final note to this chapter, it is important to understand that many types of 
infotainment systems exist across the entire landscape of the automotive industry.  Based off 
these stated observations, OEM and aftermarket system vary greatly in terms of amount of data 
acquired and methodologies for an acquisition of the data itself.  This however can and most 
certainly will change as future trends in technology emerge and more efforts and functionalities 
are put into infotainment systems as a whole, especially with data security being an important 
trend in the past decade.   
Although some extractions had limited data sets, all data extracted can potentially be 
evidence and this will always be useful to a forensic investigator, even to the slightest degree as 
it may help push a case in a new direction; this is simply the way of digital forensics as not every 
model and make of every platform is covered and supported by forensic tools due to the ever 
changing field of technology and the constant release of new devices, models and software 
revisions.  Infotainment system manufacturers could also potentially implement ways of 
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obscuring user data on these systems through confidentiality/encryption methods and this would 
add obstacles to digital forensic analysts (these concepts are not new though and methodologies 
have been developed to circumvent them).  Of course, this also depends on the hardware of the 
system and may limitations could arise.  But of course this would add more development efforts 
and costs to them which could deter fully securing these widely deployed systems.  Adding 
secure mechanisms is entirely up to the makers of the device and is something forensic analysts 
have dealt relatively well with considering the overall implications and added complications to 
data extractions and interpretations.  
This correlates directly to the variance of the data sets extracted from all the different 
infotainment platforms used in this research as mentioned above.  There may be discrepancies 
across this data due to the customized operating systems, hardware and software builds (just like 
mobile devices due to the massive amount of manufacturers and device models/builds).  This is 
simply an element in digital forensics that has to be dealt with as there are many factors to 
consider when performing an extraction on a specific device, with a specific build using a 
specific forensic tool (all of these vary vastly by themselves).  Data extractions can be difficult to 
manage and achieve due to all of these aforementioned complexities but it is a known factor 
within the field of digital forensics.  This entire research has a goal of showcasing that valuable 
information can be extracted from infotainment platforms, may it be for law enforcement use or 
to raise awareness as a whole.  This establishes a baseline for infotainment forensics and the 
usability of all recovered data artifacts.  As more of these systems are integrated in the 
transportation system, the more information will be available. With future research, a more 
standardized methodology for acquiring and parsing infotainment system data can be developed 
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and widely deployed for positive outcomes in the world of digital forensics as more digital 
information will be available for analysis and interpretation. 
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Chapter VI – Conclusion 
Computerized technological advancements have come a long way ever since the first 
inception of a computer.  With more features and functionalities being developed daily in regards 
of facilitating end users’ lives, it also permits people to engage in criminal activities with the help 
of these devices.  Digital forensics itself is a brand new field compared to the traditional 
biological forensics field; technology is constantly developing and pushing boundaries which 
makes methodologies harder to develop, maintain and standardize.  Digital forensic examiners 
must constantly stay on top of technology trends to ensure that all proper techniques and 
resources are exhausted when analyzing potential evidence.  A community of these experts with 
constant research is the best way to maintain leveled playing-field when tasked with new 
challenges and technology. 
Infotainment systems have impacted the transportation system due to the added features it 
brings to end users which include vehicle statistics, relaying information from mobile devices, 
playing multimedia content, navigating end users to destinations and so on.  Regardless, the 
overall implications from this research shows that some infotainment systems can be used to 
reveal information about its end users and their activity on the system or the vehicle itself.  This 
is very beneficial to law enforcement agencies and respective investigators as any information 
pulled from these platforms can either be evidence or help corroborate other pieces of evidence; 
vehicles in nature are very personal to their users therefore it would only helpful to investigators 
to analyze their systems.  They are even more relevant if the vehicle is an accessory to a crime 
itself, not to mention that end users can connect mobile devices (including computers) if 
Bluetooth functionalities are enabled.  It is important to note that this information could also be 
accessed by any other third party that may have access to the vehicle so caution should be 
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exercised by end users, especially when it comes to willingly connecting other devices to 
infotainment platforms as more information would be circulated.  These show great potential for 
forensic means as a lot of information is potentially circulated to these systems as vehicles are 
highly involved as criminal accessories and mostly everyone owns a mobile device compatible 
with them.  The information found on them, regardless if system, user or application data, shows 
to be of great relevance as it can help identify end users that interacted with the vehicles in 
question.  Such information should be viewed as invaluable.   
  Due to the nature of the digital forensics field, challenges were expected along the way, 
especially considering the variation among all platforms, including the different vehicle 
manufacturers and different vehicle models and builds.  The infotainment systems were 
constricted to different software, hardware and builds, which makes acquisition of images a 
challenge itself; infotainment system are similar to mobile devices and their multitude of tools 
required to complete forensic acquisitions, as well as their nature since they are also considered 
mobile devices.  OEMs showed the greatest challenge as the acquisition process required a 
custom third party hardware and software solution (Berla iVe) to just acquire the data, and iVe 
only works for very specific makes and models of vehicles.  Interpreting the data (file system 
and metadata in the least) is easier as a lot of forensic tools can parse the acquired data structures 
due to the standardized file system/operating system they use but it is no guarantee as some of 
these software revisions are modified by the manufacturer and are not recognizable (which can 
also complicate the acquisition process).  The major lack of standardization across OEMs renders 
the acquisition process to complex means without a proprietary solution; more standardized 
methodologies among OEMs and aftermarket systems need to be developed to ensure a sound 
forensic method of acquisition not to mention built-in-tool support for forensic tools for parsing 
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the data.  This does not mean it is impossible to accomplish an acquisition in a forensically sound 
matter but it currently requires extra resources and time which is sometimes not of the essence 
when it comes to legal investigations and court proceedings.  Aftermarket infotainment systems 
seem to be the more accessible platform compared to OEMs as they seem to use operating 
systems that are documented (for e.g. Android/Linux-based and Windows-based) to some extent 
(less customized then OEMs).  Although the pulled data sets seem to be more limited, there is 
many vendors and builds available to the consumer which means some of these platforms will 
show variation when it comes to what data is accessible.  There also were instances where 
parsing the storage blocks would results in “reading errors” and our forensic tool (Autopsy) 
would not be able to parse the content of the extractions.  Alas, variation in results from device 
extractions and its parsing of data is nothing new in the field of forensics due to the varying 
nature of technology itself.  This demonstrates the importance of standardization across the 
industry when it comes to interoperability of different platforms working in conjunction. 
The work that was demonstrated in this thesis paves the way for forensic examiners in 
what types of information to expect when analyzing such systems.  It is clear that more 
streamlined and efficient methodologies must be developed to ensure that these systems are not 
left unchecked as the potential for identifiable information has clearly been demonstrated.  In 
terms of future work, further research can me be made in the interactions of the CAN and MOST 
buses and if infotainment system data can be accessed and downloaded though the CAN; it 
would be interesting to find out if an acquisition method could be developed by using the CAN 
bus as the connecting medium.  This would give a standardized approach for acquiring data since 
CAN buses are universal in modern vehicles.  It would also be important to research this as it 
could determine whether exploiting the CAN bus or other internal bus components could lead to 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 135 
the download of stored information using the MOST bus (for e.g. potential for VANET 
vulnerabilities being exploited and leveraged against the infotainment system?).  An open source 
methodology could also be looked into in terms of acquiring data from infotainment systems as a 
whole.  Although not impossible, this is probably a difficult task for to accomplish for OEM-
based devices, but aftermarket systems have shown to be more accessible.  Finally, research into 
the privacy implications of the data stored in infotainment systems can be researched.  To what 
extent does these systems need personal information to operate?  Is it necessary to keep all this 
data?  Should there be an option to wipe these devices from all data (not just user profiles) and 
have encryption as an option? A question of privacy versus usability and practicability in this 
case; to what extent can law enforcement use this information and should there be limits?  
Regardless, the future of vehicular infotainment forensic is bright as much information is 
available to forensic examiners/law enforcement agencies.  This data could very well be used to 
identify end users when needed, depending on the given circumstances, which can help shine a 
new light on investigations, stop criminal activities and their culprits and even save lives.  
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Appendix 
Various Audi/Volkswagen Manual Acquisition Setup 
2014 Volkswagen Touareg  
 
Export destination options 
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Lists of previously/current connected Bluetooth devices 
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Contacts can also be exported to SIM card 
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Number of items in memory per connected devices (current and prior) 
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Examples of content that can be exported 
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2012 Audi Q5 
 
Export destination options 
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Lists of previously/current connected Bluetooth devices 
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GPS coordinates found on system  
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2014 Audi Q7 
It is important to note that this vehicle was not previously owned; device functionalities 
and their verification were checked and compared to other Audi and Volkswagen vehicles if they 
would be similar and if data could potentially be acquired through manual acquisition.  
 
Lists of previously/current connected Bluetooth devices 
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Number of items in memory per mobile device (current and prior devices) 
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OEM Infotainment System 
It is important to note that the process depicted below is the same for SYNC Gen I and II.  
Acquisition Setup Process 
 
Ford SYNC storage module 
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JTAG components attached to Ford SYNC module storage board 
 
 
Berla iVe JTAG connectors 
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Berla iVe connectors attached to JTAG components connected to Ford SYNC module 
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VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 153 
Ouku Windows CE 6 Infotainment System 
Acquisition Setup Process 
 
 
Utilities loaded in micro-SD card that will be inserted in GPS micro-SD slot 
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GPS button path now points to new executable file 
 
 
Result of executing CECMD.exe and file system view (here you can copy files to /Storage Card) 
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Pumpkin Android Kit-Kat 4.4.4 Infotainment System 
Acquisition Setup Process  
 
Commands inputted on Pumpkin platform for enabling ADB-over-WiFi 
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IP address of infotainment system 
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Connection to Pumpkin platform through WiFi and input for shell access 
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Pioneer Android-Variant Infotainment System 
Acquisition Setup Process  
 
Access to Test Mode successful  
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Access to force write options on system 
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Observed Data Examples 
2012 Ford Fiesta SYNC Generation I – Physical Acquisition 
Device name, serial and multimedia information  
 
 
iVe report showing Bluetooth MAC addresses 
Contact names and phone numbers 
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iVe report of system information 
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2013 Ford Focus SYNC Generation II – Physical Acquisition 
 
Canned SMS data found in extraction (potential for user generated one) 
 
Some emails that were extracted 
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iVe report of system information and connected devices 
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System events showing USB device being detached 
 
iVe report of all contact information and associated device 
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iVe report of GPS coordinates/breadcrumbs on infotainment system 
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iVe report of various user interactions with vehicle and infotainment system 
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2013 Ford F-150 SYNC Generation II – Logical Acquisition 
 
Device ID and contacted phone number found under call history XML file 
 
Log of passenger door being closed 
 
Various logged interactions such as odometer reading, GPS coordinates and ECU response 
 
Potential Internet user history if feature is enabled and used 
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2013 Dodge Durango uConnect version 8.4 – Logical Acquisition 
 
Test screenshot recovered 
 
Emails found in extraction 
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Potential user activity 
 
 
iVe report showing Bluetooth MAC addresses and other identifiers 
 
iVe report of SMS data and related device 
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iVe report of call logs associated to a specific mobile device 
 
 
iVe report of system information 
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Potential owner information if set 
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Device registry files can be viewed 
 
Favorited location information 
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Files containing contact and relative call logs information 
 
File showing contact names and associated phone numbers 
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Potential user information but data is not in a readable format 
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Pumpkin Android Kit-Kat 4.4.4 – Physical Acquisition 
 
Acquired MTD blocks 
VEHICULAR INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS 179 
 
Available folders (limited data) 
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Pioneer Android-based OS – Physical Acquisition 
 
Recovered background image 
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Media playlist information  
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Emails found in source files 
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Extra 
 
Example of Ford SYNC module retrieval process  
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Entire Ford SYNC module 
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Ford SYNC storage module (JTAG acquisition done on board residing inside encasement) 
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